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ABSTRACT 
In the past eight years, Ghana, like the rest of the 
sub-Sahara nations, established economic relations with the 
bloc nations. The idea behind this move was that economic 
relations with other nations would extricate Ghana's economy 
from foreign dominance and eventually help realize both ec-
onomic and political objectives set forth in the post-in-
dependence years. 
The purpose of this study was to survey the economic 
exchanges between Ghana and the Soviet-bloc nations and to 
assess its impact on the Ghanaian economy. 
The following conclusions were drawn after the study: 
1) Ghana diverted a small but significant portion 
of her trade with the traditional tra.ders to the Soviet-bloc 
nations and trade has increased in both volume and value. 
For example, Ghanaian imports from the bloc nations in 1961 
were N¢18,721 and had reached a level of N¢101,027 in 1965. 
2) That the trade has involved the primary raw 
materials from the area in exchange for manufactured goods 
from the bloc nations. Examples of the major raw ma terials 
were cocoa, hardwood, etc. and those for manufactured goods 
were tractors, transport equipment, agricultura l machinery, 
etc. 
3) :Ex.panded trade and aid neither reduced Ghana's 
balance of payments deficits nor provi ded the much needed 
foreign exchange. From this we can see that trade and aid 
was not necess arily the final answer to Ghana's economic 
v 
problems but that a realisti c trade policy, as that adopted 
in the post-coup period, was needed to ensure economic stab-
ility and political neutrality. 
4) All in all, Ghana's trade and aid experience with 
the bloc nations was very much similar to those which existed 
during the colonial economic period. This suggests that pol-
icies adopted by the newly emancipated underdeveloped coun-
tries will result only in marginal short-term chang es as a 
result of the colonial heritage, geography and economi c 
necessity . 
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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Before independence, the metropolitan European powers, 
principally Britain, France and Belgium, controlled both the 
external trade and the commercial policies of their respective 
colonies. But when these colonies once attained independence, 
they established new economic relations with a number of 
foreign governments in addition to their erstwhile colonial 
masters. This has been particularly true of Ghana which, 
since 1957, has not only renewed and enlarged its economic 
ties with West European nations but has extended its trade 
and commercial network to include some of the communist bloc 
countries. The purpose or this extension has been to in-
troduce a number of counterbalancing elements into Ghana's 
long established, extreme economic dependency upon western 
nations. 
Directly involved in new Ghanaian-Soviet bloc economic 
relationships are (a) exports composed of primary raw mat-
erials and agricultural products and (b) imports of manu-
factured goods. These exchanges, typical between less and 
more developed economies, have been financed by both long-
term and short-term credits, sometimes generously extended 
by the bloc nations. 
The bloc nations ha.ve described the aim of this re-
.... 
lationship simply in terms of mutual economic advantage; 
Ghana, on the other hand, has viewed the new economic re-
lations both as a much needed spur to further her economic 
2 
gro~th and development and as an opportunity to explore 
commercial options not elsewhere available. Furthermore, 
the promotion of trade and economic aid with the communist 
nations, it was hoped, would further a course of neutrality 
in international relations which Ghana had set for herself 
at the beginning of her national independence. 
The primary purpose of this essay is to review the 
experience in the critical period of independence, 1959-65, 
to see whether these professed Ghana-Soviet goals have in-
deed been advanced. This period is described as "critical" 
because Ghana was undergoing a very rapid economic, social 
and political transition and transformation and encountering 
problems of independence never faced before. As one example, 
the population of the young nation was growing and its needs 
multiplying yet the price of cocoa, Ghana's main crop and 
source of exchange, was falling. Faced with such problems, 
the government of Ghana sought foreign assistance to in-
dustrialize and modernize its agriculture. 
This study is divided into three main chapters in 
addition to this short introductory sta~,ement. Chapter II 
reviews the general Colonial background and the objectives 
of communist-bloc trade and aid relations with all the newly 
formed African states south of the Sahara. The aim is to 
establish a larger, regional framework in terms of which 
Ghana-communist bloc trade and aid can be evaluated. 
In Chapter III, Ghanaian-communist economic relations 
are specifically reviewed for the critical period of 
3 
1959-1965. The review includes materials on the size and 
composition of Ghana's imports from and its exports to each 
bloc country. The devices used to underwrite trade and aid 
and other related elements in the Ghanaian-communist-bloc 
economic relations are also explored. 
Chapter IV evaluates the significance' of the economic 
relations between Ghana and the Soviet-bloc countries, with 
particular reference to their impact on the Ghanaian econ-
omic structure and its significance for growth. Serious 
attention is also given to the probable future course of 
Ghanaian-communist-bloc relations. 
Throughout this essay, the terms communist-bloc, 
communist nations, bloc nations and Soviet-bloc countries 
have been used interchangeably. Each of these terms would 
refer to the Soviet Union, Mainland China, and Eastern Europe 
-- composed of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, 
Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia. Albania may be 
mentioned in passing. 
Also Sub-Sahara Africa, area, region, states, countries 
or nations used interchangeably throughout this essay may 
refer to all independent countries which are located within 
the tropical belt with the exception of South Africa. 
The account which follows is largely based on reports, 
monographs and other public documents of the government of 
Ghana, and on various United Nations publications on Africa•s 
economic progress. Information was drawn from a number of 
4 
United States Department of State and Department of Commerce 
reports and other relevant materials from journals, articles, 
newspapers and like sources. .E:Cforts to obtain corroborative 
data or information from the communist-bloc nations, however, 
nave only been marginally successful and is an acknowledged 
shortcoming in this essay. Yet the subject of Ghana's 
economic policies since independence has been of such im-
portance that even partial insight into this process and its 
consequences have been felt to be worth the effort. 
II 
GENERAL BACKGROUND AND THE OBJECTIVES 
OF SUB-SAHARA AFRO-COMMUNIST-BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Background. 
- As it is rather generally known, the "scramble for 
Africa" during the latter part of the 19th Century by western 
European nations represented a continuation of the political 
and economic penetration of the Sub-Sahara region first start-
ed by the Portuguese as early as the 13th Century. For ex-
ample, history books tell us that Prince Henry the Navigator 
.financed expeditions to the west coast of Africa, Pedro de 
Cuna landed in Sierra Leone in J.462, and in J.482 the 
Portuguese under Don Diego d 1 Azombuja reached Ghana (the 
Gold Coast), where a fort was built at Elmina which also 
served as a trading outpost. 1 I vory, gold and slaves (the 
latter a source of cheap l abour on the West Indian sugar 
cane plantations) were _the major items involved in this 
commerce. The region~ s potential as a source of raw materials 
later resulted in a vigorous competition by the Dutch, Danish, 
French and English merchants for commercial rights and the 
foreigners fou ght amongst themselves for favoured positions. 
In 1884-85, the Berlin Conference gave to each European 
country its "sphere of influence" in the Sub-Sahara area 
\1.E. Ward, A Short Histo~ or Ghana (London: Long-
man' s Green and Company Limi ted,9b0), pp. 53-54. 
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but it was not until the signing of the Treaty of Versailles 
in 1919 that sharply defined political boundries were drawn. 
With these arrangements the balkanization of the Sub-Sahara 
region was complete. Exclusive trading rights were allocated 
to outsiders, the native Africans were given virtually no 
say in trade policies formulated abroad and the resultant 
economic exploitations was enforced by the appointed colonial 
governments. Thus, W.E.B. DuBois in his book, The World and 
Africa, .wrote: 
Colonial governments are virtually ruled by in-
vestor.a in England. Investors not only dictate 
the choice of governors, but these governors have 
the sole right of legislation under the Colonial 
Office in London. They are 'advised' by councils 
on which business interests were directly rep-
resented.2 
In addition to these problems of economic imbalance 
created by colonialism or the "dualistic" system which 
steirmed from it other factors contributed to impede develop-
ment. Prominent among these have been chronic unemployment, 
low agricultural and industrial productivity and sharply 
increasing population levels which tend to reduce the poss-
ibility of saving and accumulating capital. Customs and 
traditions as well as topography have also worked against 
any attempts to transform the subsistence sectors of the 
regional economy into a more viable regional economie entity. 
Thus, the immediate and conspicuous result of foreign 
2w.E.B. DuBois, ~ World ~nd Africa, An Inruiry Into ft£ ~.Which Africa Has Played!..!! World HistoryNew York: 
n ernational Publishers Company, 1965), p. ~47. 
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or colonial enclaves in the Sub-Sahara region was a serious 
and continuous distortion of the pattern and structure of the 
traditional agrarian economic order. And it was at least 
partially to effect changes in the subordinated economic 
status of the peoples of the Sub-Sahara that modern African 
nationalism developed as a political movement seeking in-
dependence as the principal device for furthering balanced 
development and for recasting economic and social policies 
in favour of the indigenous population. 
The post-independence period witnessed a drastic ex-
pansion of many centrally directed activities which were 
designed to channel commercial transactions toward nations 
that had hitherto had little, if any, role in the Sub-Sahara 
regional economy. This development was in sharp contrast to 
the practices of pre-independence period when the Sub-Sahara 
colonial powers virtually prohibited all economic ties with 
the communist nations. A major achievement of independence, 
therefore, was that options to trade with non-Europeans as 
well as Europeans or with communist nations as well as non-
communist nations, emerged as viable and realistic economic 
possibilities. This development also opened the door for an 
expansion of the volume of trade and implied at least in 
Part, the acceptance a.nd the use of foreign economic help 
from any nation regardless of its political or ideological 
affiliation that could contribute to Sub-Sahara regional 
economic growth and development. 
In sum, the overall aims of these post-independence 
Policies were to restructure and to recast the basic economic 
8 
direction of the region without which even the elementary 
material needs of the regional Sub-Sahara could not be met. 
correlated with the implementation of these new directions, 
economic activities in the private sector of the economy 
were also encouraged. But an even greater emphasis was given 
to government economic planning and direction. 
Post-independence Sub-Sahara Objectives. 
To seek new markets, mechanize agriculture, diversify 
their crops, improve their balance of payments, and where 
possible,obtain economic aid from other governments, the new 
nations of Sub-Sahara set out the following as their goals: 
First: to channel a portion of their foreign trade to 
the communist-bloc nations both to expand the existing market 
tor Sub-Sahara products and to lim~t dependency on western 
markets which had hitherto absorbed such products. 
Second: to negotiate highly attractive trade and aid 
agreements proferred by the bloc nations. In the pre-inde-
pendence period the Sub-Sahara nations had made their pay-
ments for goods imported from other foreign trading concerns 
in cash. After independence, however, the bloc nations in 
fostering economic relations with the Sub-Sahara area agreed 
to supply identical goods based on barter agreements. Since 
such barter arrangements would invariably reduce pressures 
on the very scarce foreign exchange of the Sub-Sahara states, 
it was a major goal of policy in the 1959-1965 years. 
Third: to dispose of surplus raw materials to bloc 
nations which otherwise would be dumped on the world commodity 
9 
markets and eventually depress the going market prices for 
the commodity• 3 
Fourth: to take full advantage of the liberal interest 
rates on aid or loans from the bloc nations. While interest 
rates on western loans and credits ranged betwee.n 5 percent 
and 7 percent, the interest charges on similar loans or a.id 
tram the bloc nations for same . length of time, were between 
1 percent and 2~ percent.4 Although the Sub-Sahara states 
welcomed foreign capital, serious skepticism created by long 
colonial affiliation e a.used most ex-colonial countries to re-
examine their new relations with their previous masters and 
to question the advisability of accepting large foreign in-
vestments lest they dominate and control economic activities 
or interfere unduly in the internal affairs of the new 
nations. 
On the whole, economic cooperation with other nations 
bas been given serious thought by the nations of Sub-Sahara. 
However, they have not neglected political considerations or 
their impact on economic matters. Thus to avoid being drawn 
into the cold war, the Sub-Sahara states adopted a non-
alignment policy in their relations with other nations.5 It 
was designed to enable them to trade and to accept economic 
3 J.s. Berliner, Soviet Economic Aid: 
Jri:ade PolieI in the Underdeveloped Countr'Ies 
ederlck A. 1>raeger I ncorporated, 1958), p. 
The New Aid and 
ffiw York:"" 
20. 
4H.J. P. Arnold, Aid For Develo;inE Countries (Pennsyl-
vania: Dufour Editions-;-19~, p. Io • 
e 5Fritz Schatten, Communism in Africa (New York: Fred-~ick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966)-;-p. 175. 
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aid from any nation without incurring the risk of being comm-
itted to any ideologics.l group. On the other hand, the 
adoption of a poli cy of neutralism has not deterred the Sub-
sahara nations from identifying with either western or 
communist nations on matters of mutual concern. Similar 
reactions have often come from abroad. 
Soviet-bloc objectives. 
In order to establish successful trade and aid re-
lations with the Sub-Sahara area. the bloc countries also 
set new policies. These new policies were formulated with 
the objective of meeting bloc nations' national interests 
and at the same time providing for the economic needs of the 
Sub-Sahara area. To implement such objectives~ the bloc 
nations adopted very flexible trade and aid policies which 
were in sharp contrast to those enforced during the Stalin 
era. Economic policies of that period were directed toward 
•auturky" and a sort of monolithic or isolationist economic 
policy followed. 6 This .kind of policy was necessary because 
the bloc nations were still undergoing post-war economic 
reconstruction and were not in a position to engage in any 
serious economic activities outside their own orbit. Also. 
it will be remembered, the Sub-Sahara nations were still 
colonized and were ·considered as mere appendages of imperial 
Powers. Even the African nationalists were considered as 
6 Alvin z. Rubinstein. ~ Foreign Policy .2£. ~! Soviet 
.!!.nioA (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 175. 
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"bourgeoi s· · nationalists" and their attempts to cast away 
the schackles of colonialism were misunderstood. However, 
the soviet bloc's attitude toward the Sub-Sahara area changed 
tlben political independence was achieved. It was evident 
that the struggle for Sub-Sahara economic independence was 
crucial and when the Khruschev regime recogni~ed the oppor-
tunities involved, it re-adjusted its economic relations by 
intensely cultivating the friendship of the new nations. 7 
both as a challenge to the west and as a demonstration or its 
~illingness to help the region. In making this move, the 
bloc nations hoped, of course, to find export markets for 
finished goods which could not gain access into western 
markets. At the same time, the bloc countries could obtain 
the necessary raw materials for domestic consumption and in-
dustrial use. 8 One major student of Soviet interests has 
noted that on the wtx>le, n economic motivation is undoubtedly 
the dominant factor behind increased trade ••• but important 
. 9 political interests are frequently servedn ••• through these 
relations. 
As a part of their cold war strategy, the bloc nations 
have sought to ~'woo" the Sub-Sahara nations into the socialist 
camp; hence most of their economic exchanges have been con-
centrated on Sub-Sahara states which have favoured "Af rican 
7Rubinstein, ibid., pp. 396-397. 
8 -
Pr Raymond F. Mikesell and Jack N. Behrman, Financing 
~ .!orld Trade With the Sino-Soviet Bloc (New Jersey: 
nceton University, 1958), p. 26. ~ 
9 1££ • .£.!!., p. 25. 
12 
... 11· sm" as for example Ghana, .Guinea and Mali. However, SoCJ.c;o. 
the'Y' have also supported monarchies such as Ethiopia with the 
to maintaining their old trade ties and thus counter-vieW 
. fl 10 balance western in uence. 
Devices used in underwriting trade and aid agreements. 
Trade and aid between the Sub-Sahara nations and the 
bloc countries have been primarily fostered through government 
agents or representa.ti ves which serve as the main channels 
for negotiation. However, other devices for underwriting 
trade and aid agreements have been developed and usea. 11 To 
promote trade and aid, trading partners from both the Soviet 
nations and the Sub-Sahara area have participated in world 
trade fairs where various wares available from each par-
ticipating country have been displayed for examination. In 
this way, prospective customers have had the opportunity to 
compare quality and prices in order to make their choice from 
many offers. 
In addition, educ.ational and cultural exchanges have 
been used as supplementary techniques. But on the whole, 
protocol negotiations have emerged as the most pre-dominant 
devices for facilitating continuous economic ties between the 
two regions. Usually the provisions of each negotia. ti on 
specify the nature of the transaction, (as to whether it would 
(C lO~bigniew Brezenski, Africa .~nd the Communist World 
alifornia: Stanford University Press,"1:96j), pp. 30-31. 
llM.k i esell, ibid., p. 30. 
13 
be based on mult l ·l ateral or bilateral trade agreement or 
that payments would be made in cash or through barter ex-
changes), the interest rate on credits or loans and the time 
within which such payments were due, would be stated in the 
document. 12 Although the Sub-Sahara area states negotiated 
aost of their trade agreements on . mult i lateral bases with 
the traditional traders from the west, bilateralism became 
the cardinal point of trade and aid agreements with the 
centrally planned economies of the bloc nations. According 
to R.F. Mikesell, the use of bilateral agreements, 
provides a general method of financing current trade 
between two countries, giving rise to credits which 
are freely available for use by one country in 
making paY'tf~nts for goods and services imported from 
the other. J 
Thus such bilateral agreements negotiated between the 
Sub-Sahara nations and the bloc nations, assured the former 
that any trade balances would be settled by goods from the 
debtor nations. Over the 1959-1965 period, bilateralism 
therefore has featured significantly as the means by which 
numerous commodities have been exchanged between the various 
trading partners.14 
The basic export items from the Sub-Sahara region have 
included such tra.di tional raw materials notably cotton, cocoa, 
12Brezenski, ibid., p. 60. 
l3Raymond F. Mikesell, F'oreign Exchange in Postwar 
(New York: Twentieth Century, 1954), p. "8b. 
14Rubi,nstein, ~., pp. 393-394. 
peanuts, hardwoods and many other tropical products. The 
import list has been composed mainly of manufactured goods 
including both durable and non-durable goods. Of the non-
dUrables foodstuffs, apparel and other textile products have 
counted most. Durables have been made up of metal products, 
machinery, both electrical and non-alee trical, transport 
equipment and other miscellaneous manufacturing items. While 
most of the non-durables were for domestic consumption, the 
manufactured goods were used in establishing import substitute 
industries or for processing and curing local raw materials 
tor consumption and export. 15 
Since 1962, general trade between the Sub-Sahara 
region and the bloc nations has expanded. The expansion 
may be due (a) to the continuous trade between both regions; 
(b) the increase in the number of independent Sub-Sahara 
nations trading with the bloc nations; 16 and (c) the increased 
liberalization and independence of bloc nations in making 
international trade and aid agreements without first consult-
ing any other bloc nation. 
As Tables I and I"I, pages 15 and 16 show in 1962 the 
total of selected Sub-Sahara imports from the communist bloc 
nations totaled lJl.l millions of current u.s. dollars. By 
1963 imports amounted to $152.5 million and by the end of 
1964 the import bill was $174.6 million. Thus communist bloc 
W t 15Economic Survey of Africa, United Nations Vol. 1, 
81 ern Sub-region, (E/CN?I4/376), 1966, pp. 48-49. 
16 Brezenski, ~., p. 59. 
TABLE I 
COMMUNIST IMPORTS FROM SELECTED SUB-SAHARA AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1962-64 
(IN MILLIONS OF CURRENT U.S. DOLLARS) 
Total USSR 
Area and Country 1962 1963 l9q4 1962 1963 196Y, 
Total (Africa) $145.l 202.L~ 204.2 59.7 78.l 57.9 
Sub-Sahara Region 112.2 157.2 ·136.2 
Angola. 1.6 0.5 
Cameroon 0.5 -.l 
Congo (Brazzaville) 0.2 0.3 
Ethiopia 1. 7 2.3 
Federation of 
Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland •••••••• 20.3 25.4 
Ghana 28.3 35.6 
Guinea 12.5 13.3 
Ivory Coast 0.2 0.3 
Kenya 0.5 1. 7 
Mali 6.9 3.0 
Nigeria 5.2 5.1 
Sudan 31-;.4 45.1 
Tanzania 1.2 12.8 
Uganda 1.7 11. 7 
a.Less than $50,000. 
n.a. Not available. 
o.6 
o.6 
0.9 
3.0 
J.4.0 
33.9 
10 .1 
2.5 
4.4 
6.9 
12.8 
24.2 
11.2 
11. l 
50.8 63.8 44.6 
-- -- --
-- -- --
-- -- --
1.2 2.0 2.4 
13.6 16.0 4.3 
16.7 21~ 6 20.7 
2.6 2.3 2.2 
-- -- --
-- x 0.1 
4.4 3.0 3.7 
o.8 o.6 4.2 
10. 6 17 .2 5.0 
0.9 1.1 2.0 
-- -- --
Eastern Europe Communist China 
1962 1963 1964 1962 1963 1964 
66.8 78.9 94.0 18.o 45.4 42.6 
47.2 54. 8 53.1 13.6 37.6 28.8 
1.6 o.5 0.4 0 -- 0.2 
o.5 -.1 o.6 
0.2 0.3 o.6 
--a -- 0 .3 0.5 0.3 o.6 x 0 
4.2 8.3 n.a. 2.5 1.1 n.a. 
10 • 4 13 • 5 10 • 4 1.2 o.5 2.8 
9 . 3 10 .1 7.6 o.6 0.9 0.3 
0.2 0.3 2.5 
--
0.7 3.2 0.5 1.0 1.1 
2.5 -- 1.2 -- -- 2.0 
4.4 3.5 7.0 ·x · 
--
1.6 
11. 4 15. 4 14. 3 8.8 12.5 4. 9 
0.3 1.3 2.7 -- 10 .4 6.5 
1. 7 0.5 2.0 0 11.2 9.1 
SOURCE: Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, Research Mem-
oranda, RSB-50, June 17, 1966, Table 2, p. 17. 
f....I 
\.Tl 
'l'ABLB :IX 
COMMUNIST EXPORTS TO SELEPTED SUB-SAHARA AFRICAN COUNTRIFS, l.962-64 {IN MILLIONS OF CURRENT U.S. DOLLARS) 
Total 
Area and Country . 1962 1963 1964 
Total (Africa) $178 .9 224.2 279.2 
Sub-Sahara Region 131.1 152.5 174.6 
Angola 0.5 0.5 
Cameroon 1.1 1.1 
Congo (Brazzaville) 0.2 0.1 · 
Ethiopia 5.3 6.8 
Federation of 
Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland •••••••• 1.8 1.2 
Ghana 26.9 41.5 
Guinea 30.6 23.8 
Ivory Coast 2.0 0.1 
Kenya 0.9 1.8 
Mali 11.6 15.7 
Nigeria 19.6 22.1 
Sudan 28 .8 3L~.8 
Tanzania l. 7 l. 7 
Uganda 0.1 1.3 
aLess than $50,000. 
n. a . Not available. 
0.5 
1.4 
0.1 
9.3 
1.1+ 
53.1 
21.8 
.1.5 
6.5 
17.6 
28.8 
28.4 
2.5 
1. 7 
USSR 
1962 1963 1964 
59.5 84.3 89.5 
49.8 58.3 53.2 
-- -- --
-- -- --
-- -- --
o .8 1.1 3.3 
0 0 
--
9.9 16.7 19.5 
20.0 14. l 9.2 
-- -- --
--
x x 
8 • 6 12 • 2 13. 2 
0.1 o.6 1.2 
10 .}+ 13.6 6.6 
0 x 0.2 
-- -- --
Eastern Europe Communist China 
1962 _1963 1964 1962 1963 1964 
87 .110:6.6132. 3 32.3 33.3 55.9 
64.7 74.6 84.8 16.6 33.J 55.9 
0.5 0.5 0~ 5 x x x 
1.0 0.9 1.1+ 0.1 0.2 x 
0.2 0.1 0.1 x 0 0 
3.4 4.1 4.2 1.1 1.6 ;i..8 
1.5 1.0 n.a. 0.3 0.2 n.a. 
13.2 22.7 30.9 3.8 2.1 2.7 
10. l 5.6 4.2 0.5 4.1 8 .4 
0.3 0.1 0.9 l. 7 x 0.5 
o.8 1.5 4.6 0.1 0.3 1.9 
2.2 2.3 1.6 o.8 1.2 2.8 
15.1 17.1 18.8 4.4 4.4 8.8 
lli.6 16.9 15.2 3.8 4.3 6.6 
1. 7 1.1+ 1.1+ x 0.3 0.9 
0.1 0.4 1.0 x 0.9 0.7 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, Re search 
Memoranda, RSB-50, June 17, 1966, Table 1, p. 12. ..... a-
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eXPorts to selected Sub-Sahara areas showed constant increases. 
This was true of eastern European communist nations and 
communist China, but not of the Soviet Union whose exports 
dropped from a level of $58.3 millions reached in 1963 to 
$5J.2 millions shown in 1964. 
Total exports from selected Sub-Sahara African nations 
to the communist bloc nations during the 1962-1964 period were 
marked by increases and decreases. In 1962, the selected 
Sub-Sahara regions export total was $112.2 million dollars. 
It increased to $157.2 million in 1963 but dropped off to 
$1J6.2 million current u.s. dollars. Exports to all the 
bloc nations were characterized by gradual decreases which 
were experienced by all the Sub-Sahara nations. 
As material for comparison,Tables I and II show the 
import and export levels for selected Sub-Sahara region. 17 
As these tables show, the Soviet bloc nations took a 
passive position in the balance of trade with the selected 
Sub-Sahara Africa nations which bought from the bloc nations 
more than they sold to them. 
Co'llllllunist-bloc economic aid to the Sub-Sahara area. 
Though great importance has been given to trade be-
tween the Sub-Sahara area and the bloc nations, both trading 
Partners have not confined their economic activities to 
l7united States Department of State, Director of 
Intelligence and Research, Research Memorandum, RSB-50: i;66, Oommunist Governments and Developing Nations: Aid and 
__ a<!!_ 1965. Washington: Government Printing Office, 196e;:-" 
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trade only. A survey of available material showed that trade 
relations have been supplemented by the granting of economic 
aid and loans.1~ Over the years 1959-1965, various kinds of 
economic aid in the form of long-term and intermediate range 
credits, loans and technical assistance as well as military 
aid bave been extended to the nations of the Sub-Sahara area. 
The term aid has been given different interpretations 
in various instances but as understood below, aid means the 
transfer of foreign capital or technological and scientific 
]mow-how from the bloc nations to the Sub-Sahara region for 
the purpose of accelerating economic growth and development. 
The concept of aid did not originate from the in-
itiation of economic exchanges between Sub-Sahara Africa and 
the bloc nations. It dates back to the period before World 
War II when economic aid technical assistance was given by 
the more well-off nations notably Britain and France to their 
impoverished overseas possessions. Since then, aid has been 
given to most developing nations by .both private and/or 
government agencies as well as world organizations for ec-
onomic ~evelopment. Until then, it was greatly doubted if 
the kind of aid offered by the metropolitan governments of 
the colonial era could seriously be considered as aid, in-
1tead of being considered as part of their economic programme 
tor their possessions which in some cases were integral 
iBib"d 
---!._., p. 7. 
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th metropolitan area.19 Kwame Nkrumah, the former parts of e 
President of Ghana, seemed to support the view that foreign 
capital of any form from the colonial powers could not be 
regarded as aid. In Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of 
Impexdalism, he noted, "before the decline of colonialism 
- ~ llbat is known as aid today was simply foreign investment, n 
intended to yield profit to the investors without necessarily 
enhancing economic growth and development in the Sub-Sahara 
area. The same idea was shared by Pro.fessor Frederick Benham 
wbO llrOte, "it is pleasant to .feel that you are helping your 
21 
neighbour and at the same time increasing your pro.fits." · 
From these observations, it could be concluded that in the 
past, aid was intended to enrich the investors at the expense 
ot the people of Sub-Sahara. area. 
To correct this undesirable situation, the more de-
veloped nations took the initiative in assisting the less 
developed nations as part of their e.ffort to help reconstruct 
the economy. In the post-World War II period, the United 
States set the pace by giving financial aid through the 
Marshall Plan to the European nations for economic recon-
atruction. Following the United States' example, Britain, 
A · 19~.M.B. Little and J.M. Clifford, International Aid, 
~ Discussion of the Flow of Public Resources From Rich to 
oor iountrie'i; trnlicago,-Yliinois: Aldine Publishing "C'Om-
pany (}66 ) , pp. 17 -18 • 
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1 Kwame Nkrumah, Nao-Colonialism: The Last Stage o.f 111perialism (London: Thomas Nelson, l965)7°P.-;!':' -
C 2:-Jprederick Benham, Economic Aid to Underdeveloped 
_9untries (LJ:>ndon: Oxford Uru.versitY-Press, 1962), p. 24. 
TABLE III 
COMMUNIST ECONOMIC CREDITS GRANTS TO SELEC TED 
SUB-SAHARA AFRICAN COUNTRI ES , 1954-65 AND YEAR 1965 (MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS) 
1954-1965 1965 
20 
East Com. East Com •. 
Total USSR Europe China Total USSR Europe China 
Total 7, 718 5,030 1,873 815 1202 655 488 59 
Africa 1,287 729 294 264 94 0 79 15 
Sub-Sahara 
Region •••••• 886 471 105 210 64 0 49 15 
Congo (Brazzaville) 36 9 2 25 0 0 0 0 
Ethiopia 119 102 17 0 5 0 5 0 
Ghana 231 89 102 40 20 0 20 0 
Guinea 120 70 25 25 0 0 0 0 
Ien1a 62 44 0 18 0 0 0 0 
Kali 98 55 23 20 0 0 0 0 
ligeria ll+ ·o 14 0 14 0 11+ 0 Senegal 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 Somalia 85 57 6 22 0 0 0 0 Sudan 32 22 10 0 10 0 10 0 
Tanzania 51 0 6 45 0 0 0 0 Uganda 31 16 0 15 15 0 0 15 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, Director of Intelligence 
and Research. Rese arch Memoranda, RSB-50, June 17, 1966. Table 1, p. 7. 
21 
e Belgium and other western nations embarked on similar :rranc , 
aid projects. With the decline of the so-called aid of the 
pre-independence period, both private and public or inter-
national organizations have given aid to the nations of Sub-
sab&ra. These aid schemes have been formulated and admin-
iitered on government to government bases. Since the Soviet 
blOC nations have given some kind of aid, this type of 
arrangement has been very suitable to th.em. 
Soviet-bloc nations began to offer aid at the time 
vhen economic relations were established. Between 1954-1965, 
the communist countries credits and grants to Africa amounted 
to 1,287 million dollars. Of' this total, 886 million dolls.rs 
vere allocated to the selected Sub-Sahara African nations. 
The Soviet Union contributed a total of 471 million dollars 
and Ghana obtained more than one-half of the total allocated 
credits and grants. Chinese credits and grants amounted to 
210 million dollars of which 45 million dollars were offered 
to Tanzania, while the e:astern Europ.ean communist nations aid 
contribution to Tanzania amounted to 6 million dollars. In 
all, the east European countries total amounting to 205 
million dollars were evenly distributed among the Sub-Sahara 
1tates. 22 
Although the loans and credits from the bloc nations 
have increased since 1954, they have not reached the same 
levels as credits and loans offered by the western nations. 
2~ So ib u.s. Department of State, Research Memorandum, RSB-
' -!,2.' p. 2. 
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In 1965 the .flow of loans to the Sub-Sahara .from the bloc 
e reduced to a minimum Total credits and loans nations wer . • 
amounted to 94 million dollars which were contributed by 
onlY eastern Europe and China. The Soviet Union gave neither 
credits nor grants to the region. 23 
The credits granted were used .for all kinds of in-
dustrial and agricultural projects. However, the bloc nations 
credits have not been restricted to shipments o.f machines 
and other equipments for industrial use but also have been 
made available for the execution of planning and research 
projects, and also to cover the costs of Soviet-bloc organ-
izations and specialists who advise on the selection of 
building sites a.nd development projects. 
The Educational Programme. 
The Sub-Sahara region has always been in short supply 
ot trained man-power. To help alleviate the very acute short-
age of trained man-power, the Soviet-bloc nations have been 
very active in education.al and vocational training programmes. 
Since 1959, these training programmes have had top priority 
in the bloc nations aid plans, ahead of all other measures of 
economic and technical assistance. The training programmes 
include two different kinds of ins true ti on. 
(i) The schooling of officials for the trade unions, 
for journalists, women's and young people's 
23]E_c • 
.£.ll., p. 2. 
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organizati ons and other mass-organizations. 
(ii) The training of a national elite of scientists, 
doctors, engineers and technicians. 
The bloc nations have financed these training projects. 24 
Military aid also has featured very significantly in 
the Sub-Sahara-Soviet bloc ties. For national security and 
defense purposes certain Sub-Sahara nations in spite of their 
non-aligpment policies, have entered into military aid agree-
ments with the more advanced nations. For example the previous 
French colonies have some kind of defense agreements with 
France, but Ghana, Guinea, Ma1i, Nigeria, Talzania and 
Ethiopia among others, have diversified their defense con-
tracts among communist-bloc and/or western nations. Pre-
aumably this would ensure the Sub-Sahara states a steady 
supply of anns in case of national emergencies. As part of 
the aid programmes, military personnel have been trained in 
the bloe nations, where most of the arms and ammunitions bave 
been pro cured. 
To summarize, it would be worthwhile to point out that 
the Soviet-bloc countries have initiated many activities in 
the field of education, industrial and technical aid in ful-
fillment of their promise to assist Sub-Sahara region to re-
construct their economy. Almost all Sub-Sahara nations have 
accepted aid from the bloc nations. However, they have not 
a ibid u.s. Department of State, ~., p. 7: also Schatten, 
----=.•. p. 177. 
l' 
Prepared to accept ideological implications. been 
Observations• 
-
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Since 1959, with the resurgence of Sub-Sahara interest 
in the Soviet-bloc, there have been increased economic ex-
changes between these r .egions. As we have noted, numerous 
projects, including the building of social infrastructure, 
schools and hospitals as well as agricultural experimental 
rarms have been undertaken. These projects have attained a 
small degree of success in the sense that Sub-Sahara area 
realized their objective of exchanging their raw materials 
tor manufactured goods. However, these exchanges did not 
help reduce the balance of payments or improve the foreign 
exchange position. The Soviet-bloc nations on the other 
hand, have had partial successes. 
The small degree of success achieved by the Soviet-
bloc nations has been marred by failures and embarrassment. 
Por example, Guinea which had been considered as the toe-hold 
ot the communist nations in west Africa, expelled Soviet 
Ambassador Daniel Solod for alleged interference in Guinean 
internal affairs. The failure damaged the Soviet prestige in 
the other Sub-Sahara states, where the governments became 
wa17 or Soviet activities. Such diplomatic failures coupled 
•1th miscalculated and poorly planned economic projects have 
disrupted the new economic ties. The bloc nation's failure 
••1 be due to the fact that unlike the western nations they 
have had very little association with the Sub-Sahara area. 
1'he lack of adequate knowledge of the effects of tropical 
25 
•eather on machines originally designed for use in temperate 
es but have been shipped to the Sub-Sahara area, has worked son 
to the disadvantage of the bloc nation. These tools and 
equipments failed to function efficiently and broke down 
under the duress of the weather and possibly because they 
~ere mishandled by unskilled operators. As these pieces of 
equipment were left on farms or construction sites, the bloc 
nations have been blamed for their inferior goods. 2.? Although 
spare parts were often in short supply, the bloc nations made 
no attempt to construct subsidiary industries in the area to 
provide for the necessary accessories. On the other hand, 
the stringent bureaucratic measures and red tape character-
iatic of the centrally planned economies only delayed the 
needed machinery or spare parts. As a result, development 
projects had to be either suspended or abandoned for long 
periods until such authorizations would be granted for the 
26 
shipment of such goods. Such delays have caused the Sub-
Sahara area to depend o~ the bloc nations for their needs. 
The increased Soviet-bloc investments in the area, have grad-
ually tied the economies of the region to the economies of 
the bloc nations. 
In a way the communist bloc economic activities in 
the Sub-Sahara area have not been quite different from those 
ot the colonial exploiters. 
P~eas 0 Lask:y, Victor, The ~Russian, (New York: Trident 
1965), p. 27. 
26 
F.c Morris Bornstein and Daniel R. Fusfeld, The Soviet 
l'r~l~mi, ! Book of Readin~s, (Homewood, Illinois: ""Richard D. 
g , Inc:-;-I9b2), pp. 95-297. 
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Plementary note. SUP_ 
- It has been indicated previously, that duri ng the 
colonial period, foreign traders had trade monopoly in their 
overseas colonie s. As a f'orm of compensation or inducement, 
these traditional traders granted special trade and aid con-
cessions or what was generally known as "pref'erential treat-
ment" to their colonies. This kind of treatment, or bribe 
was a technique used for tying the trade with the mother 
country. In some cases tariffs were not imposed on agric-
ultural goods from the colonies and the French subsidized 
the peanut industry in most previous French West African 
colonies. 
In the post-independence years, preferential treat-
ment was reduced to a minumum. Instead, trade was supp-
lemented by economic aid. Countries from both east and west 
traded with and gave aid to the numerous nati ons within the 
Sub-Sahara region. The entry of these nations created a 
competitive trade and aid situation, ·in which each na t ion 
was using the most ef'fective method to mainta i n economic 
ties with the area. The British, French, West Germany 1 
Japan and the United States controlled larger portions o:f 
trade. This did not mean that the Sub-Sahara area were 
having any favour able trade. Trade deficits increased and 
debts expanded and as in the case 0f Ghana, its foreign 
l'eserves were depleted. In a .vi:gbrous s earch for a way of 
ending this unfavourable trade, the bloc nations were added 
to the roll of competitors. 
I 
I 
~' 
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But, in order to compete effectively the bloc nations 
granted various incentives to the Sub-Sahara countries. The 
blOC incentives generated from the nature of terms of trade. 
Whereas western traders demanded cash payments, the bloc 
nations agreed on commodity exchanges on bilateral terms. 
Technical, military, as well as financial aid were all com-
ponents of the terms of trade. Unlike the west, the bloc 
nations were in a better situation to carry on these policies. 
The competitiveness created a plethora of problems 
while posing as a dilemma to the area which was exposed to 
many markets supplying differentiated goods on varioµs terms. 
It must be mentioned that the competition was not between 
the bloc nations and the west only. It was also among the 
bloc nations that did not have any regional economic policy 
in the Sub-Sahara area. Each nation pursued a policy fav-
ourable to national objectives and not much attention was 
given to what other nations were doing in any Sub-Sahara 
country. The same could be said about the nations of Sub-
Sabara Africa. 
But each Sub-Sahara nation tried to manipulate the 
contused situation and to take advantage of it. No partic-
ular nation counted on any bloc nation (even the traditional 
traders) as the final source of supply. These nations sought 
tor the ideal commodity and the most favourable terms avail-
able. The bloc nations often made generous offers but were 
Un&.ble to meet all the agricultural and industrial goods and 
accessories needed in the area. Changes in tastes accounted 
-
-i: 
s~ing from country to country in quest of quality tor the 
goods. Much of the payments of these goods were made from 
the proceeds of agricultural products, but the unstable 
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prices of agricultural products enabled these foreign nations 
to exchange a few expensive finished goods for large quan-
tities of agricultural products. Upon reaching a ceiling 
and fearing that commodity prices may fall, they resell the 
products, "dumping" on the world market. The raw material 
producing nations are forced to look elsewhere for markets 
tor their goods. But the Sub-Sahara nations do not plan 
their foreign trade and the bloc nations who plan are not 
liable to fulfil their targets, consequently there are 
decreases and increases of trade' in both regions. 27 These 
and many other reasons have contributed to the unsteady 
pattern of trade. 
As mentioned previously, the entry of the bloc nations 
into trade and aid relations with the area, set up a spiral 
ot competition among the . traders. There were many suppliers 
and many buyers of differentiated goods. But no particular 
producer or purchaser could seriously influence trade in 
the area. 
(Wa hi 27Robert Loring Allen, Soviet Economic Warfare 
8 ngton 3 D.c., Public Affairs Press, 1960), pp. 164-166. 
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GRAPHIC DEMONSTRATION OF THE FLUCTUATING 
TRADE WITHIN THE REGION 
Dolls.rs per 
unit 
(price) 
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QUANTITY/TIME 
I 
s 
Pigure l. Illustrates the Sub-Sahara region's long-range 
adjustments under changing trade conditions. 
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D = Sub-Sahara Africa demand schedule for L quantity 
of goods from the traditional traders. 
S = Supply schedule for the traditional traders. 
E = Equilibrium point for the exchange between these 
areas. 
P = Favourable trade:, terms or p r ice at which each 
nation is prepared to sell or purchase goods. 
L = Quantity of goods demanded and supplied by trad-
itional traders. 
m. = New demand schedule when faced with L' quantity of' 
goods f'rom the bloc nations. 
S• = New supply schedule for the bloc nations. 
E• = Equilibrium point for the new demand and supply 
schedules. (M~y be consider ed as unstable). 
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pr ::: Lo'W price (favourable terms of trade made by the 
bloc nations but below which trade would not be 
continued because trade would be unfavourable.) 
L,'· ::: Quantity of goods demanded and supplied by the bloc 
nations and the traditional traders at P1 • 
PEP'B 
p I f 
E' :' 
L' I 
::: the different prices at which any nation would be 
prepared to sell or buy for quantity LL'. 
::: Lower price plus incentives to induce trade for 
L'' quantity of goods. 
= Equilibrium established when DD' shifts to the 
left along the SS' schedule for L'' quantity of 
goods at OP 1 1 dollars per unit;. 
= Quantity of goods demanded and supplied by traders 
at pt I• 
From this model, a long-range equilibrium position 
based on free entry and/or changes in national trade a.nd aid 
policies was established. Each foreign nation continued to 
trade under the moBt favourable trade conditions. Thus when 
the new nations (specifically the bloc nations) entered into 
the ar&.a, there were shifts in the original supply and demand 
as well a.a equilibrium points. 
Starting with DD and SS as the original market demand 
and supply curves, trade equilibrium was established at E 
for the price of OP dollars for OL. With the entry of the 
bloc nations, demand increased, thereby shifting Sub-Sahara 
D•D• curve upward to the right for OL 1 quantity at OP' dollars 
per unit. Competi tion between the suppliers was intensified. 
Aa more goods were made available, the foreign traders or-
iginal SS curve shifts downwards to S'S' for OL' quantity at 
OPt dollars per unit. With a price differential P-P' the Sub-
Sahara nations could purchase LL' quantity. The area had a 
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determined by price and costs as well as non-economic 
choice 
factors. But at equilibrium point E 1 , both sellers and buyers 
reached the bottom and neither would be ready to offer or 
purchase any more goods at OP' for OL 1 • However, each foreign 
nation would be prepared to make concessions on non-economic 
incentives as for example good will missions just to keep 
ties ~ith the region. 
It must be mentioned that if the Sub-Sahara reached 
a saturation ppint, trade may either be terminated or that 
there would be a downward shift to the left of D'D' curve 
along S'S' curve, thereby creating another equilibrium at 
E'' for L'' at P1 '• But no nation, having exhausted its 
incentive offers, would be prepared to offer any goods. Any 
tutmre demand would cause s• to shift along D to E, the or-
iginal equilibrium, thereby reestablishing trade. This kind 
ot fluctuating trade would continue as long as the Sub-
Sahara external trade remains a function of economic and 
political policies adopted by both the region and the foreign 
Dations. 
III 
GHANA-SOVIET-BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
As we have seen in Chapter II, the nations of Sub-
sabara Africa pursued, as independent states, trade and aid 
policies with both European and non-European nations. Though 
t}lese policies have taken different forms, the objective of 
expanding trade, attracting investment and soliciting aid 
tor economic development have been the same. For the 
communist-bloc nations, particularly, these developments 
bave furnished both the opportunity for them to expand trade 
and extend aid and to cultivate the friendship of the nations 
ot the Sub-Sahara. regions. 
At the time .of independence, Ghana had no direct 
oonnections with any ~overeign government except Britain; but 
1oon after independence, the government adopted a policy of 
1trict neutrality and then establish~d economic relations 
With other governments whenever it was deemed advantageous. 
BJ' 1959, efforts were being mEtde to break loose from some of 
the western entanglements. In essence this meant a complete 
change in the colonial economy; the Ghana economic system 
Reeded overhauling to make transition and transformation 
Poaaible. It was in the light of the need to diversif7 and 
to change her subsistance economy into a modern-market econ-
llQ' that Ghana sought trade and aid with the communist-bloc 
lations although traditionally she had only traded with the 
1 
11estern nati ons• 
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In the previous Chapter the nature of the trade and 
aid structure of the colonial period and the attendant econ-
and social problems syndromatic of the Sub-Sahara region 09iC 
discussed in general form. Also, the innumerable efforts 11ere 
111 the area of trade and aid which have been. made in cooper-
ation with other nations in the post-independence years to 
101ve these problems were considered. The discussion that 
tollows surveys specifically the post-independence Ghana-
Soviet-bloc economic relations. The investigation is con-
tiuid to Ghana's ex±ernal trade and other economic exchanges 
aucb as aid and technical assistance given by the bloc nations 
cluring the 1959-1965 period. 
Direction of external trade. 
It is well known that Ghana, like other nations of the 
Sub-Sahara, traded with the United Kingdom, continental 
lllrope,and with the United States. The sterling area, the 
European Economic Community and the dollar area, respectively 
Vere therefore the main Ghanaian trade partners. Though in 
1959, this trade remained almost the same by 1960 , t he trade 
pattern tor overal1 trade changed drastically. 2 The comm-
Ullist-bloc nations entered into trade agreements with Ghana. 
!heae negotiations marked the beginning of the competition 
l 
Icon Walter Birmingham, I. Neustadt and E.N. Omaboe, The 
l!Va0!I E.f. Gh~n~! Vol. 1. A Study of Contempora!:I_ Ghana. 
P. 3~:on, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 
2 Q_ha.na. Economic Survey, 1965, ibid., p. 37. 
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Ghana had a favourable trade with the European Econ-
community in 1964, their imports to Ghana were 23.0 Per-o1r1ic 
cent of Ghana's total imports while exports were 29.4 percent. 
Hollever, in 1965 Ghana had a trade surplus with the European 
r.conomic Community -- imports from the area were 21.4 per-
cent, and exports to the area were 27.8 percent of the total. 
BUt Ghana had a trade surplus with the dollar area in :J.965; 
exports were 18.6 percent and imports were 10.5 percent of 
the total import/export bill.4 
Ghana had an unfavourable trade balance with the 
United Kingdom. In 1964, Ghanaian imports were 27 .q. percent 
and exports were 23.1 percent and in 1965 imports from the 
United Kingdom were 25.8 percent while exports to Ghana were 
20.8 percent. The decline in exports to Ghana's traditional 
trading partners may be attributed to the fall in prices of 
Ghana's main primary product (cocoa) in the world market.5 
As compared with the rest of Ghana 1 s trading partners 
(from the west), the bloc nation~· s trade with Ghana was not 
large. Through barter arrangements Ghana traded cocoa for 
manufactured goods which she needed for immediate consumption 
and for long-range capital projects. At a time when Ghana's 
foreign exchange was dwindling away, the bloc nations pro-
Vided the goods which could have been bought only with hard 
4~ . .£!!., p. 38. 
5~., p. 39. 
Principal (Excluding 
Countries Albania) 
Bulgaria 
China 
Czechoslovakia 
German Democratic 
Republic • • • • 
Hungary 
Poland 
Rumania 
u.s.s.R. 
Yugoslavia 
Trade Total 
TABLB l:V 
DIRECTION OF TRADE. 1961-1965a 
(VALUE IN ooo•s ·~··· PERCENTAGE) 
Imports 
c.i.f. 
mt 132 
2,042 
3,643 
3,264 
734 
2,930 
NA 
5,285 
691 
Nftl8,721 
1961 
Per.· 
cent 
0.7 
10.9 
19.5 
17.4 
3.9 
15. 7 
28.2 
3.7 
100.0 
F.xports 
f .o.b. 
0 
204 
173 
0 
0 
1,243 
NA 
7,249 
1,754 
10,623 
Per 
cent 
0 
1.9 
1.6 
0 
0 
11. 7 
68.3 
16.5 
100.0 
Imports 
c.i.f·. 
N¢ 338 
3,223 
3,425 
2,084 
1,289 
4,109 
67 
4,390 
1,963 
N¢20 ,088 
1962 
Per 
cent 
1.6 
15.4 
16.4 
10.0 
6.2 
19.7 
0.3 
Exports 
f .o.b. 
367 
1,070 
1,495 
1,805 
1,795 
3,377 
0 
Per 
cent 
1.6 
4.6 
6.4 
7. 8 
7.7 
14.5 
0 
21.0 10,428 44.9 
9.4 2,911 12.5 
100.0 23,248 100.0 
Syearbook of International Trade, United Nations, Department of Economics and Stat-
istical Aff airs, Statistics of the United Nations, U.N. Publication, (St./Stat/SER.G/16, 
1965)' p . 301. 
bExternal Trade Statistics of Ghana, Vol. . xv, . No. 12, Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Govt. Printing Dept.,- Accra, Ghana-, - 1965, p. xx. 
w 
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TABLE IV (continued) 
196.5 
Principal Countries Imports Per Exports Per (Excluding Albania) c.i.f. cent f .o.b. cent 
Bulgaria N¢ L~,584 4.5 1,707 2.9 
China 12,593 12.5 4,873 8.4 
Czechoslovakia 13,037 12.9 4, 427 16. 7 
German Democratic 
Republic • • • • 7,379 7.3 2,586 4.5 
Hungary 6,089 6.o 2,070 3.6 
Poland 16,949 16.8 5,806 10.0 
Rumania 3,488 3.5 899b 1.6 
u.s.s.R. 25,716 25.5 26,975b 46.1 
Yugoslavia 11,192 11.0 8 ,568 14. 8 
Trade Total N¢10l,027 100.0 57,911 100.0 
.___.__,.__,._ . · a; " y·-~~ ~ 
1966 
Imports Per 
c.i.f. cent 
N¢ 7,346 3.3 
22,006 10.0 
36,872 16. 7 
19 ,95.6 9.0 . 
15,111 6.8 
35,930 16.3 
4,104 1.9 
57,577 26.1 
21,84 7 9.9 
N¢220,749 100.0 
Exports 
f .o.b. 
4 ,246 
8,989 
7,691 
11,468 
4 ,590 
19,292 
899 
76,159 
25,019 
158,355 
Per 
cent 
2 • .7 
5.7 
4 .9 
7.2 
2.9 
12.2 
0.5 
48.0 
1.5.8 
100.0 
w 
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h on the llfestern market. The economic exchange resulting cas 
trom establishment of economic relations between Ghana and 
the bloc nations was an option not elsewhere available. 
Trade between Ghana and the respective bloc nations 
bas at times been favourable and at other times unfavourable. 
AD analysis of Ghana's trade with bloc nations in the period 
we have surveyed shows increases or decreases in exports to, 
and imports from each of these nations. Variations have like-
wise been quite common in the volume of particular commodities 
both imported or exported. An analysis of the trade showed 
that during the entire 1959-1965 period, Ghana experienced 
considerable trade fluctuations similar to those experienced 
'b1 the other Sub-Sahara nations. With the exception of 
Rumania and Albania, the proportion of trade with the Soviet 
Union, Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, East Germany: 
and Czechoslovakia has shown constant increases. (6 ,7) 
By the end of 1961-1965 period Ghana's trade turnover 
totaled to approximately ¢380 thousands. Table .lV shows that 
Ghana's imports for the same period was ¢220,749 thousands. 
BJ the end of 1965 Ghana's total import value of ¢101,027 
thousand was more than double the 1964 import level.(B,9) 
6Yearbook of International Trade. United Nations, 
Department of Economics and Statistical Affairs, Statistics. 
:ERr the United Nations, United Nations Publication, (St,/Stat/ 
.Gtl6,l965), p. 301. 
1965• 7 External Trade Statistics of Ghana, Vol. XV., No. 12, Ghana Central Bureau of StatisticB; P.O. Box 1098, Accra, 
, PP. xvr-xxr. 
8 
.!££. cit., p. 301. 
9~. cit., pp . jcvi·-xxi~ 
I 
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The 1965 total reached the highest peak since Ghana-communist 
economic relations were inaugurated. 
on the export side, Ghana's total for the 1961-1965 
period was ¢158,355 thousand. From 1961 the level of ¢10,623 
Ghanaian exports to the bloc nations reached a peak of 
¢57,911 thousands in 1965. On the whole Ghana i ncreased her 
volume and value of trade with the entire bloc nations. Un-
fortunately, Ghana has had trade deficits with all the bloc 
nations with the exception of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 
for example ,, by 1963, Russia had an accumulated trade deficit 
with Ghana of over $700 million. lO 
It is worth noting that the decreases in exports to 
the bloc nations was attributable to the fact that Ghana 
could not supply the bloc nations with any new commodities 
besides the regular crops. As a result, Ghana's balance of 
payments deficit with the rest of the bloc nations increased. 
Commodity composition. 
As Table V on page 41 s hows, the trade between Ghana 
and the bloc nations was composed of imports and exports 
Cotllrlon to the various geographic regions. The products 
traded were t ypical of a less developed country, Ghana, 
trading with developed nations. 
The following is a summary of the pattern of imports 
and exports involved in that trade based on materials in 
10 
. Marshall I. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), p. 175: 
i 
'! 
TABLE V 
GHANA'S TRADE WITH COMMUNIST BLOC NATIONSa 
BY MAIN COMMODITY CATEGORIES, 1965 
(VALUE IN 000 1 s N¢ •• , PERC ENTAGE) 
Commodity 
Total 
Food and live animals 
Beverages and tobacco 
Crude materials, inedible except 
mineral fue l s •••••• 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and 
r elated materials •••• 
Animal and vegetable oils and 
fats • • • • • • • • • • • 
Chemicals 
Manufactured goods classified 
chiefly by material •••• 
Machinery and transport 
equipment • • • • • • • • • 
Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles ••••••••• 
Commodities and Tr ansactions 
not classified . accor ding to 
kind • • • • • • • • • • • 
a r ncluding Albania. 
Imports Percent 
N¢.l00,990 100 .00% 
4,671 4 .6 
375 0.4 
110 0.1 
6,808 6.7 
32 0 .3 
3,406 3.3 
47,156 46.6 
24, 552 24.3 
10 ,951 10. 8 
2. 929 2.9 
Exports Percent 
NriL57 ,917 100 • 00% (approx. ) 
55,388 95.63 
0 0 
1,744 3.0 
123 0.2 
0 0 
0 0 
1 .001 
2 .003 
. 0048 o.oo 
659 1.1 
SOURCE: External Trade Statistics of Ghana, Vol. XV., No . 12, 1965, Centra l Bureau 
of Statistics , Accra, Ghana, pp. xvi-xxi. - +:"" I-' 
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Table III. As can be readily observed, imports into Ghana 
:rrom the bloc nations have consisted of capital goods; not-
ablY agricultural machinery, steel products, construction 
supplies and industrial equipment. _ Imports of mineral fuels, 
lubricants and related materials for use in transportation 
and generation of electrical power have been on the increase. 
Imports of food and live animals, manufactured goods class-
U"ied chiefly by material, machinery, transport equipments 
and other miscellaneous manufactured articles and chemicals 
increased in overall importance and value. Animal and veg-
etable oils and fuels and crude materials have not shown. in-
creases, probably because such items were available locally. 
Beverages and tobacco accounted for a considerable portion 
ot imports; exports, however, were nil. 
As to the structure of exports to the bloc nations, 
an analysis showed that the first place was occupied by food 
and live animals followed by raw materials and fuels. Exports 
ot other items have been very small and in most cases non-
existent. From this data it would appear that Ghana does 
not export any manufactured goods to the bloc nations. The 
data also suggest that relations with the bloc countries in-
corporating barter agreements have made available manufactured 
articles and other items which could not have been obtained 
elsewhere given Ghana's meager foreign exchange. 
Since 1959 Ghana has traded with al most all the comm-
unist countries. In all, Russia and Yugoslavia have ex-
Perienced growing trade while others have experienced sharp 
43 
tall-off of Ghana exports. In 1965, Ghana's imports were 
concentrated on China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia, and in the same period Ghana shipped a large 
portion of its exports to these nations. On the other hand 
Ghana's trade with Albania was non-existent in the period 
surveyed and only very limited trade was conducted with 
aumania, (exports to Rumania for the 1961-1965 period totaled 
'899). 11 In order of importance the Soviet Union was the 
largest trader with Ghana followed by Yugoslavia. 
Ghana has had an export surplus with the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia since 1961. By 1963 Russia had accumulated a 
trade deficit of $700 million indicating that Ghana sold 
large quantities of its main crop {cocoa) to the USSR but as 
put by one observer, was unable to :find nuseful and suitable 
goods to purchase from the Soviet Union. "12 With the other 
nations however, Ghana's defiei ts have been extremeJ..y large. 
While the proportion of Ghanaian exports to the bloc nations 
as a percentage of total exports has ·increased, in the same 
period Ghana's imports have doubled. 
In sum, a survey of the trade between Ghana and the 
communist bloc . nations for 1959-1965 period reveals that 
Russia and Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent China, have 
contributed to the bulk of bloc-Ghanaian trade. Though a 
•arked increase was experienced in this trade with communist 
St t 11united Nati ons . YearlX>ok of International Trade 
_a istics, 1965, ibid., p . 301. -. .. - == 
12 Goldman, ~., p. 175. 
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nations, the commodity composition did not reveal significant 
changes over time. The only unrecorded items which have un-
doubtedly entered into Ghanaian-bloc exchange are arms and 
munitions. It may be reasonably concluded that Ghana's trade 
"With the bloc nations has been fostere d b ecatise of the en-
larged variety of commodities made available from the differ-
ent bloc nations. Thus, both increases in the volume of 
trade, and changes in the directional flow of goods are the 
visible evidences of Ghana's new trade policies initiated 
after independence. 
Credits and technical aid. 
As part of Ghana's overall external economic policy, 
she has not only fostered new options in trade but also 
foreign private investments as well as expanded credit and 
teohnical aid from foreign government agencies. In response 
the communist-bloc nations in particular have offered attrac-
tive long and short-term credits to enable Ghana to finance 
her economic development projects. 
The most significant development of the credit or 
financial aid practices of the bloc nations has been their 
very liberal aid terms. These terms stipulated interest 
rates of 2~ percent to 3 percent and repayments ranging from 
a duration of three to twelve years that may be made in 
Ghanaian goods. 13 The long-range aggregate total credits 
- - --
13u.s. Department of State, Director of Intelligence 
and Research, ibid., p. 3. 
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extended to Ghana from the communist countries was $231 
million. Of this, the Soviet Union contributed $89 million; 
cbina•s contribution amounted to $40 million and the rest 
of the bloc nations extended a total of $102 million. By 
l96S the flow of credits had been reduced. The total fell 
ott to $20 million from the communist nations, excluding the 
soviet Union and China whose contributions have been nil.14 
'l'lle drop in credits probably was a retaliation to Ghana's 
decision to sell its cocoa for hard cash. 
In addition to credits at these low interest rates, 
the bloc nations have catered Ghana's need for technical ex-
perts. Each bloc nation has provided technicians for the 
planning, construction and actual field work on any particular 
P.roject started. Bloc personnel haa worked side by aide with 
Ghanaian counterparts and have trained the latter with the 
view to preparing them to take over the tools and equipment. 
1 Contrastingly, for one reason or another, Ghana• a re-
lations with the western nations were deteriorating rapidly 
and deapi te the fact that the volume of trade and private in-
vestments was reduced, Ghana received some form of economic 
aid from the western nations. 
The United States, in particular, continued to give 
economic aid to Ghana. The aid was channeled towards gen-
erating agricultural production and improving education. The 
14u.s. Department of State, ~., p. 2. 
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Of $82.0 million in ioans was extended to Ghana, and be-sUDI 
t~een 1960 and 1965 the United States sent $6.l million worth 
15 
of food for peace to Ghana. However, the most significant 
project, the Volta River Dam, was undertaken by two private 
u.s. companies, the Kaiser Aluminum Company and the Reynolds 
Aluminum Company though technical assistance was also featured 
significantly in u.s. aid. Similar aid efforts have been 
made by the United Kingdom, West Germany, Japan and a number 
of other western nations. 
Nonetheless, the flow of western aid to Ghana in the 
period we have reviewed continued to decrease, a decrease 
which can be ascribed to Ghana's decision to institute 
"Socialism" and an impression created in a number of western 
capitals that Ghana was becoming a Soviet satellite in West 
Africa. Thus, Ghana's avowed adoption of "Socialism" affected 
Ghana's economic ties with the west adversely. The Times of 
!Dndon wrote in e.ffec t that , the United States, Britain, 
Japan and a number o.f west European governments have turned 
down requests of the Ghana government .for hundreds of millions 
or dollars in emergency loans to alleviate a desperate bal-
16 
ance of payments situation facing the nation. Ghana in her 
eighth year as a nation, was already .facing the most serious 
economic crisis. The unique and critical element in Ghana's 
economic chaos, was attributed mainly to the breakneck speed 
15 C0trnn U.S. Department of Commerce, (Bureau of International 
erce), Overseas Business Report 66-36, June 1966, p. 1. 
16T. 65 imes. London. April 14, 19 • 
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at which the programmes for industrialization and agricul-
tural development were pursuea. 17 
The discussion which follows, pertains to the overall 
economic aid projects initiated by the Ghanaian government in 
cooperation with the respective bloc nations. It Will be , 
followed by the various devices used ~in negotiating these aid 
agreements. 
Russian aid projects. 
During the latter part of 1957, a two man delegation 
from the Soviet :Einbassy in London visited Ghana. The prim-
ary purposes of Mr. Imitri F. Safanov, the first Secretary 
to the Soviet Embassy and Mr. V.J. Smirnov, deputy trade 
representative, were the opening of a diplomatic mission and 
and the establishment of trade relations with Ghana. 18 
Soon after the visit, Ghana and the Soviet Union 
signed a technical aid agreement under which agreement eight 
civil engineers from the Soviet Union would conduct a pre-
liminary survey into the . planning of residential areas in 
Accra and Terna. To help reduce the shortage of housing, 
the design was intended to provide housing to accomodate 
25,ooo people in Accra and 12,000 in the new harbour town 
ot Tema. Under a similar agreement, thirteen Russian fish-
eries experts were expected to establish a string of fishery 
17 0 Observer Foreign News Service, April 21, 1965 9 p • . 12. 
18 New York Times, November 20, 1957, p. 1:2. 
19 
industries in Ghana. 
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As part of the overall trade and aid promotion being 
undertaken by the Ghana government, the Minister of Works and 
Housing, Mr. E.K. Bensah and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Mr· Ako-Adjei and Miss Regina Assammany, a woman parliament-
arian, toured the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, 
Hungary and Poland to recruit technicians for the Ghana Civil 
service. 20 In the summer of 1961, the then President of 
Ghana, paid a state visit to all the communist-bloc countries. 
Mr. Kwame Nkrumah in the company of a number of his ministers 
and high ranking party members, negotiated and signed agree-
ments with the bloc nations for trade and aid purposes.21 
In Ja..nuary of 1962, Anastas I. Mikoyan, the Soviet Duputy 
Premier, conf'erred with the then President and six cabinet 
22 
ministers. Ghana and the Soviet Union ratified a 
42,000,000 long-term trade and payments agreement and also 
an agreement for the expansion of economic and technical 
cooperation in fulfilment of the sunmier, 1961, tr.ade and aid 
agreements. 23 
Although industrialization seemed to be the main 
19 
J.ill.' June 13, 1961, 2:7. 
20Ibid., July 17, 1961, p. 3 :1. 
4, 21Ibid., 1961; ~ July 10, 1961; August 1, 1961, 21:4; August 
22rb · January 12, 1962, 6:3. id., p. 
-
23I bid., 
-
February 2, 1962, p. 9:1. 
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preoccupation of the government of Ghana, the govermnent gave 
agriculture equal attention. To avoid the dependence on one 
crop, efforts were made to introduce new crops and new methods 
in farming. The Soviet Union agreed with Ghana to cooperate 
in experiments in large scale cotton growing and in the estab-
lisbment of state farms. These farms were designed to op-
erate as settlements with hospitals, community centers and 
schools ., which would be managed by Ghanaians trained in the 
. 24 
soviet Union. By 1963, the number of state-owned and op-
erated farms had increased to 105. Most of these concentrated 
on general farming, but some were used to experiment with 
possible new crops. 25 
Ghana expanded her air transport services when it 
negotiated agreements for a new Ghana Airways route from 
Accra to other points. In 1961, Ghana purchased 8 I~shin . 
18 propjets from the Soviet Union. The purchases proved un-
economic and 4 of the airplanes were eventually returned. 
The rapid progress in air transport in Ghana made it feasable 
for the remaining Il~hin 18 propjets to be maintained at 
the Accra base, but at the time of purchase all 8 planes had 
to be flown to Russia for maintenance. Ghana Airways had a 
total of 1,282 employees including 119 expatriates, 26 of 
Whom were Russians. 26 As of late 1964 there were only 27 
Ghanaian pilots but more staff members were being trained by 
24Africa Report, July, 1962, p. 11. 
25New York Times, January 20, 1964, p. 61:1. 
26 . Africa Report, February 1965, p. 23. 
Ii 
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Alitalia Air Lines, Britain and Russia. A total of 15 
soviet trained pilots returned to join the stat,f. Four 
pilots, after three years of training in the Soviet Union, 
returned to operate the airlines Ilyushin ,aircraft.27 
For continued trade and economic relations, Mr. J.B. 
Elliott, Ghana's Ambassador in Moscow and Mr. Y.A. Malik, the 
soviet Deputy Minis ts:, exchanged instruments of ratification 
on the protocol signed on March 4, 1963, on economic and 
28 
technical cooperation. To alleviate shortage of well-
trained manpower, Ghanaian students registered in Russian 
Universities to do courses in medicine, engineering, agric-
ulture, refrigeration, radio, electronics and electrical 
engineering. The training would qualify them to man the 
State Fishing Corporation's trawlers and purse-seiners. The 
training ranged from four to seven years under the Ghana-
Soviet Technical Assistance Program.29 The State Fishing 
Corporation expanded its fishing fleet in 1965 by purchasing 
12 trawlers composing 8 from Russia and 4 from Norway.30 
A protocol was signed for cooperation between Kwame 
lkrumah University of Science and Technology and Kiev 
University. The agreement emphasized exchanges of film and 
l'adio progra:ran:et and the exchange of education speci alists. 3l 
27rb· 65 -2:.9_., December 19 , p. 23. 
28 Ghana Today, Vol. 7, No. 18, November 6, 1963, p . 2. 
29Loc. cit., p. 2. 
- --30 Economic Survez, 1~65 , ibid., p. 63. 
3111:r r.r c$. Report:;- February, 1965, p. 44. 
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Under a similar program, twenty-five teachers were teaching 
and mathematica in secondary schools.32 science To help 
eradicate dis eases, Ghana and the Soviet Union signed an 
accord which required of the Soviet Uni on to build and equip 
a 200 bed hospital at Half-Assini at the cost of about 
$1,680,000. A nurses training school, hostel accomodations 
tor 60 students and out-patient facilities for 200 patients 
daily would be attached to the hospitai. 33 As a friendly 
gesture, the Soviet Ambassador to Ghana, Mr. G. M. Rodinov, 
presented to the government of Ghana 50,000 doses of vaccine 
against typhoid, para-typhoid and tetanua. 34 
Soviet projects in Ghana ·have ' i ncluded industrial 
establishments. Russia contracted for the construction of 
complex fishing industries in the vicinity of Terna Harbor. 35 
Also the Soviet Union agreed to assist in the construction 
of a prefabricated concrete panel factory in Accra. It was 
one of the many joint projects between the government of 
Ghana and the Soviet Union to solve housing problems in the 
country.36 The Ministry of Industries announced the con-
struction of a $515,200 gold refinery at Tarkwa. Provisions 
ot the agreement were that the Ghana government would con-
struct the refinery structure and the Soviet Union would 
32~., November, 1965, p. 38. 
33Ibid., January, 1964, p. 23. 
34Ibid., February, 1965, p. 44. 
35Ghana Today , Volume 7, No. 18 , November 6 , 1963, p. 7. 
36 ~., Volume 7, No. 17, October 23, 1963, p. 2. 
provide machinery and the necessary technical and advisory 
personne1. 37 On November 21, 1964, the President laid the 
foundation for the construction of $840,000 gold refinery 
38 
llith the assistance of the Soviet Union. 
on behalf of the government, the Finance Minister, 
Kwasi Amoako Atta, signed an agreement with the object of 
39 increasing Soviet-Ghana trade by 20 percent. 
For defence purposes, the Minister of Information, 
Tawia Adamafio, announced that 400 cadets would be sent to 
the Soviet Union for training.40 The Soviet Union offered 
as a gift, Ghana's first atomic reactor at Kwabenya.41 
Czechoslovakia. 
Ghana concluded trade and aid agreements with 
Czechoslovakia f'or the purpose of purchasing the necessary 
manufactured goods for consumption and industrial develop-
52 
ment. In return Ghana sold agricultural products. Follow-
ing the exchange of trade missions to .Czechoslovakia, Ghana 
placed an order of about ·$2,800 1 000 worth of tractors from 
Czechoslovakia42 and in December 1965, the first tractor was 
assembled at the Motokov Tractor Assembly at Nsawam.43 To 
37Africa Report, October, 1964, p. 23. 
38~., January, 1965, p. 26. 
39~., February, 1965, p. 34. 
4°New York Times, October 1961, p. 13:1. 
4l~i~eport, July, 1962, p. 26. 
42~., November, 1962, p. J.4. 
43~., December, 1965, p. 23. 
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enhance manufacturing, Ghana and Czechoslovalda jointly es-
tablished a sugar factory at Komenda. The total cost was 
estimated at about $12,000,000 and was expected to produce 
10,000 tons of refined granulated sugar each y ear.1+4 The 
Fuel and Pm.ier Secretariat of Ghana with technical assistance 
from Czechoslovakia, started the construction of small power 
projects on the Tano and Pra Rivers in the south of Ghana.45 
The C~echoslovakia news agency "Ceteka" announced the expan-
sion of Czechoslovakian medical aid to Africa in 1963. There 
was a total of 151 Czechoslovakian medical personnei (107 
doctors and 44 health workers) in 12 African and Asian coun-
tries, including 88 in Tunisia, 29 in Guinea and 11 in 
Ghana.46 
Rumania. 
Ruma.nia' s diploma tic and economic relations were es-
tablished with Ghana in 1961 and since that time, exchange 
of trade missions have taken place between both nations.47 
Geologists from Rumania conducted comprehensive surveys of 
oil deposits in Keta, Koforidua, Bonyere and a mineral s pot 
in the northern r egion.48 Following the survey, the Ministry 
ot Fuel and Power announced tha t the government had ordered 
44Ibid., March, 1965, p. 36. 
45ahana Today, Vol. 7, No. 18 , November 6, 1963, p. 3. 
46 Africa Report, March 1963, p. 26. 
47New York Times, August 12, 1961, p. 29:5. 
L~8 Af r i ca Report, July, 1964, p. 26 . 
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t~o drilling rigs costing $2,100,000 to search for oil in 
49 Keta area. Oi l drilling experts started operations on the 
project?0 and found oil of ".reasonable quantity." 
china· 
- Mainland China extended aid to Ghana through instru-
ments signed in Pekin in 1962 by the President of Ghana in 
the August of 1961. 51 China granted Ghana an interest free 
loan of G 7,000,000 ($19,450,000) payable within a period of 
10 years. The loan agreement stipulated that payments could 
be made with export goods from Ghana or with currency of a 
third country agreed to by the Chinese. Included in the 
agreement was a provision that the Chinese government would 
supply technical assistance in the form of experts, equipment, 
and materia1. 52 
China agreed to set up a $20,000,000 cotton spinning 
and weaving factory and enam.el and pottery factory in Ghana. 
It also agreed to provide the necessary technical assistance 
and a number of Ghanaians woµ ld be trained in China.53 A 
team of two Chinese agriculture experts arrived in Ghana with 
the object of surveying and establishing rice and cotton 
49Ibid., August, 1965, p. 27. 
50ibid., November, 1965, p. 38 . 
51New York Times, March 29, 1962, p. 6:4. 
521.!?..!.£., August 22, p. 13:1. 
53 
Africa Repori, December, 1962, p. 21. 
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farms. $4 
yugoslavia. 
- As have many other bloc nations, Yugoslavia has offered 
technica l and financial assistance to Ghana. Accordi ng to pro-
visions of an agreement signed in Accra, Ghana would build 
four slaughterhouses and a pineapple juice factory, and con-
struc_t a naval base with technical and f i nancial assistance 
from Yugoslavia. A new station to service about 6,000 agric-
ultural tract~rs built by a Yugoslav Company, Messrs. 
OMNICO Limited, was opened a t Terna. It was the first of a 
series of tractor stations to be built in various regional 
centres i n Ghana to service 60 Yugoslav tractors in use on 
State farms. 55 
A purchase of 12 fishing vessels costi ng $1,401,456 
was made by the government of Gha na from Yugoslav firm 
Brodoimpex. 56 
Ea.st Germany . 
Followi ng the move taken by other bloc nations in 
assisti ng Ghana, Paul Scholz, the Deputy Prime mini ster of 
East Germany (German Democratic Republic) negotiated credit 
and shipping agreements with Gha na . 57 East Germany co ncluded 
technica l a nd economic agr e ements under which the German 
Democratic Republic would exten d a credi t of $20, 000, 000 to 
54Ibid., October 1965, p. 46. 
55Ghana Today , Vol. 7. No. 6 , May 22 , 1963, p . 2 . 
56Africa Repor t, May, 1965, p. 33. 
57rbid., November, 1964, p. 33. 
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establish a pulp and paper making mill and a timber process-
ing complex.58 Under a similar agreement, eight East German 
teachers took appointments in secondary schools in Ghana. 
Poland. 
-
Polish economic aid to Ghana has followed the pattern 
adopted by Russia, China, Yugoslavia and other bloc nations. 
The purpose of the projects have been directed towards ag-
ricultural and industrial development. To attain the object-
ive, Polish technicians sta-rted industrial projects in Ghana. 
Ryszard Dodrowolsi, head of the Polish technical team announ-
ced that the projects included a shipping yard, a steel plant, 
iron ore mi ning and sugarcane and candy industries.59 The 
Ghanaian Fishing and Supply cooperatives signed a commercial 
agreement with Polish Agriculture Cooperatives. According to 
the agreement, ncEKOP", the Polish Central Trading Organ~ 
ization for Foreign Trade would extend a $4,620,000 credits 
for the construction of a cane sugar _plant and molasses dis-
tillery at Asuchuere in -the Volta Region. The refinery is 
expected to produce 24,000 tons of granulated and cube sugar 
a year. The signing of the agreement brought the number of 
indus t rial projects undertaken in cooperation with "CEKOP" to 
60 
eleven and a .. total of $8, 820,000 of credit. 
58~., October, 1965, p. 46. 
~9 New York Times, September 10, 1961, p. 108:3. 
60 
Africa Report, March, 1962, p. J.4. 
summary. 
For the 1959-1965 period, Ghana has welcomed trade and 
technical experts with the bloc nations with aim of promoting 
trade and aid. The communist-bloc nations have increased 
their a.id and trade with Ghana and almost every bloc nation 
}las invested i n Ghana. But the bloc nat i ons have not en-
joyed complete monopoly over trade and aid in Ghana de~pite 
the numerous light industrial establishments and increased 
trade. Both western governments and private companies have 
undertaken technical and industrial projects as part of the 
overall effort to assist Ghana's economic growth and develop-
ment. By trading with and accepting aid from either east or 
west, it was hoped that Ghana could purchase such consumer 
and industrial goods wh ich otherwise would be restricted to 
it because of its obl igations and alliance with a special 
ideological . group. 
I., DEVICES USED IN UNDERWRITING TRADE AND AID AGRh"'EMENTS 
To fac i lita te trade and aid a greements, Ghana estab-
lished official channels through which economic and political 
affairs could be negotiated. Ever since, there have been 
exchanges of goods and technical personnel between Ghana and 
the bloc nations, to consider and execute matters of mutual 
interest. 
The government of Ghana and the respective communist-
bloc nations have signed various trade and aid agreements in 
Accra and other bloc capitals. These negotiations pertain to 
reciprocal trade and techni cal aid arrangements negotiated 
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during the 1959-65 period. The agreements stated t he necess-
8:!7 conditions for aid and terms of trade; and demonstrat ed 
the importance of continued Ghanaian communist-bloc economic 
relations. 
Since the inception of the relations, Ghana has sent 
trade missions to bloc nations with the sole object of know-
ing what goods are available to them and to acquaint them-
selves with new methods in industry and agriculture. The 
most important missions undertaken in behalf of Ghana trade 
and aid, took place in 1961. I n the summer of that year, an 
official delegation headed by the President of Ghana, Mr. 
Kwame Nkrumah, toured all the bloc nations. The President 
succeeded in signing numerous trade and aid agreements cov-
ering most of the economic projects discussed in the pre-
ceeding paragraphs. 
These trade and aid arrangements were in many respects 
similar to those concluded between the bloc nations and the 
rest of the Sub-Sahara nations in the. sense that all the neg-
otiations were in the form of protocols. Although each doc-
ument might have its unique feature, all the agreements still 
had common characteristics such as stipulations on the ex-
piration period or the rate of interest in the case of loans. 
So far my research has not revealed any prohibitive con-
ditions on the resale of Ghanaian products. 
Ano t her feature was tha t the trade agreements were 
concluded for one to five year periods and provided gradual 
increases in goods turnover.61 Such increases in the 
61 Arnold, 2.£• cit., p. 137. 
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59 
reciprocal trade was mainly agricultural products, (cocoa 
products, tropical fruits, timber, etc.), while the bloc 
nations supplied machinery and equ ipment, fertiiizers and 
other commodities needed for consumption and economic develop-
ment. Short-term and long-term interest free credits ex-
tended by Red China and Russia at 2.5 percent interest on 
credit are some of the main aspects of agreements concluded 
by the bloc nations and Ghana. 
Ghana has relied upon the trade and aid agreements as 
mechanisms for promoting and improving its trade and aid 
prospects. However, the conditions for trade and aid have 
not always been observed by the trading partner; a case in 
view is Soviet Union which re-exported Ghana cocoa. The then 
President of Ghana announced in the Ghana Parliament that 
the government has decided to stop selling cocoa on "barter" 
and only to sell for "hard cash. 11 Such policy would ensure 
the availability of liquid funds to finance Ghana's develop-
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ment. Ghana did not end the barter agreements with the 
bloc nations although it was true that Ghana was not always 
receiving the full value of goods in return for the cocoa 
shipped to the bloc communities, or that it received un-
aui table goods. 
To summarize, for the 1959-65 period, Ghana extended 
her economic activities to trade and aid agreements with the 
bloc nations. Among others, these arrangements covered the 
62 
The Financial Ti~, July 22, 1965. 
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area of education and agriculture as well as technical aid. 
The primary purpose of these ties was to advance Ghana's 
economic interests and to encourage better relations with 
trading partners that could enlarge Ghana's trade and offer 
aid on the most favourable terms. Thus the establishment of 
economic ties with the bloc countries was a partial ful-
filment of Ghana's objective to accept trade and accept aid 
from other nations without subordinating Ghana's national 
interest to any nation. 
IV 
EVALUA TION OF THE TRADE AND AID RELAT I ONSHIPS 
OF GHANA AND THE SOVIET-BLOC NATIONS 
For Ghana, trade and aid with the bloc nations has 
been an important economic tool both for the realization of 
her national goals and the enhancement of mutual economic 
and technical relations with other nations. The purpose 
here will be to evaluate the significance of these Ghana-
communist-bloc economic relations in terms of their impact 
on economic growth in Ghana, and possible future course of 
Ghanaian-Soviet-bloc relations. 
Since the inception of Ghana-Soviet-bloc economic re-
lations, : ma ny important changes in the trade and aid mech-
anisms in Ghana have taken p lace. A fair evaluation of the 
significance of the Ghana-communist-bloc relations only 
calls f or a close examination of the changes which are the 
results of these relations. 
Changes in trade policies -- general observations. 
Pr i or to the initiation of trade and aid relations 
with the bloc nations, foreign trade was conducted between 
individua l Gha naian merchants and t heir foreign counterparts 
in the west. Thi s interactio n was ba sed on the 11 l a issez-
faire" concept. Trade was exclusively carried on by in-
dividua l citizens wl th very little government inter vention. 
The role p l ayed by the government of Ghana was confined to 
regul ation of trade to ensure fair trade practices. But when 
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Ghana extended trade with the bloc nations soon after in-
dependence, drastic chanees were made in the trade policies. 
The old commercial and trade policies were not replaced, but 
a new policy, stressing the need for maximum government in-
tervention and serious participation in both domestic and 
foreign trade was introduced. In addition to active par-
ticipation in trade the government or Ghana established state-
owned and operated enterprises as well as state farms. 
The state enterprises were charged with the respon-
sibility for the sale and purchases of imported goods from 
the communist-bloc nations. The state enterprtses were 
further authorized to compete with other foreign and local 
1 
traders for profits. 
The creation of autonomous state enterprises and cor-
porations was the direct result of Ghana 1 s effort to provide 
new trade arrangements in order to be able to carry on ec-
anomic exchanges with the bloc nations. It must be borne in 
mind, that the Ghana-Soviet-bloc economic relations were 
principally government to government concerns, hence private 
businessmen were not forced to participate in these dealings. 
The new trade techniques brought in other new factors. 
Along with the government to government trade and aid, 
came the means for negotiating trade and aid agreements. To 
facilitate this, a new technique based on bilatera1 trade 
P 1Kwame Nkrumah, Blue~rint of Our Goal. Seven Year ~~' GP/ Al065/12000/3/63-6 . (Accra, Ghana: Published-by the 
in1stry of Information and Broadcasting, 1964), p. 4. 
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and aid agr eements negotiated through protocol agreements 
~as introduced. These exchange agr eements were in sharp con-
trast to the previous import-export payments agreements which 
\olere characteristic of multilateral agreement techniques 
adopted by private entrepreneurs. Under the multilateral 
agreements, payments for export and imports were made in 
cash, contrary to bilateral agreements under which commodity 
exchanges were required. 
To insure complete centralization and control over 
imports and exports, the government of _Ghana introduced im-
port controls. Another objective for instituting import 
controls was to re duce unnecessary import goods (i.e. luxury 
items) so as to cut down on foreign trade deficits. Such a 
measure had its side effects. Besides violating the prin-
- . 
ciples of the General Agreements on Tariff and Trade, the 
import control measures resulted in shor tages in industrial 
and consumption goods followed by inflation. (The effect of 
these are dealt with elsewhere in the Chapter. ) 
In spite of the results of the import control measures, 
government trading agencies centrally directed imports and 
exports in accordance with Ghana governments external trade 
and aid policies as specified in the national plan. 
We could observe that the establishment of economic 
relations with the bloc nations has necessitated the adoption 
of new trade and aid policies. While the old trade policies 
remained, the new ones encouraged government participation 
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in trade at the expense of private industrial initiative. 
state enterprises and corporations exercised monopoly over 
trade with the bloc nations while industrial activities on 
behalf of private businessmen were reduced to a minimum. 
Technical and educational-cultural relations. 
Since the initiation of eco nomic ties with the bloc 
nations, great emphasis has been put on human-investment. 
To achieve this goal, the bloc nations have left no stone 
unturned in training Ghanaians in various bloc institutions. 
Thus in industry and agriculture, Ghanaians are able to fill in 
with qualified and skilled personnel in high administrative 
positions hitherto occupied by foreigners. 2 Ghana has taken 
full advantage of the bloc experts either as advisors on in-
dustrial planning or as researchers in agriculture or any 
other field. Cultural exchanges have been intensified to 
promote mutual understanding and cooperation.3 
Ghana-Soviet-bloc trade evaluated. 
Over the 1959-1965 period, Ghana pursued a policy which 
stimulated trade with the bloc nations. 'rhe result was an 
overall expansion of her share of the world market and an in-
crease in her trade with the communist-bloc nations. About 
23.8 percent of Ghana•s total trade was devoted to trade with 
bloc nations in 1965 as compared with 11.8 percent in 1964. 
2Economic Survey, 1965, ~., p. 104. 
'Cl- 3Fred Tickner, Technical Coo~eration, ( New York: 
~rederick A. Praeger, Publishers, l $6), pp. 104-105. 
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Between 1965 and l966, Ghanaian imports from the 
soviet-bloc nations slacked from N¢84.158 million to N¢38.106 
million. For the same period, exports from Ghana to the bloc 
nations were reduced from N¢48.264 million to N¢40.233 mill-
ion, giving Ghana a very small favourable balance of trade.4 
This is shown on Fi gune 1. The favourable balance holds 
true only when total trade with the bloc nations is con-
sidered. Otherwise, Ghana's trade with individual nations 
within the communist-bloc complex showed either deficits or 
surpluses. 
By the end of 1965, the balance of trade situation 
had become so precarious5 that a change in policy was re-
quired. A new trade and aid policy was adopted by a new 
administr~tion when the Nkrumah regime which originated the 
trade and aid relations was overthrown. 
The changes in the trade and aid policies resulted in 
severe set-backs in Ghana-Soviet-bloc economic exchanges. 
The decline in general trade ~nd aid with the bloc nations, 
wa.s the direct result of a review of the Bilateral Trade and 
Payments Agreements, after February 24, 1966. This review 
resulted in the cancellation of some of these agreements 
which were not in the interest of Ghana. 6 The "review" of 
bilatera l tra de and payments affected Ghana's cocoa exports 
and _t her e?y Ghana's source of income. The Ghana Economic 
4 Economic Survei, 1966, ibid., p. 36. 
5Economic Survei, 1965, ibid., p. 38. 
6Economic Surve;t, 1966, ibi d., pp. 34-35. 
survey commented, 
Total exports of cocoa b eans to the u.s. s .R. 
and the eastern countrie s dropped by 13.l 
percent in volume. The value tota led N¢37.7 
million in 1966 compared with N045.Lt- in the 
previous year showing a fall of 17.0 percent. 
With the exception of East Germany, all the 
eastern countries imported less cocoa be,ns in 
1966 compared with their 1965 purchases. 
Pattern of Trade. 
67 
In general, the Ghana-Soviet-bloc trade and aid did 
not follow any steady pattern. It was characterized by 
fluctuati ons which might have been due to changes in the 
allocations of resources required by national economic plan. 
Another important trait of the trade and aid was that it was 
confined to traditional commodity exchanges. Ghana continued 
to supp ly agricultural raw materi a ls while the bloc nations 
supplied Ghana with manufactured goods. The relations re-
mained the sterotype economic relat ions between less devel-
oped economies and the deve loped industria lized economies. 
This situation, of course, accounted for the l asting economic 
ties between Ghana a nd the bloc nations. Although Ghana 
hoped to reduce h er depende ncy on more advanced na t i ons for . 
her economic needs, in the final analysis, Ghana could not 
but depend on the bloc nati ons for most of her industrial 
needs. Thi s relati onship brought back the y oke created be-
tween ( neo-colonia lists) i ndustr ialized na t i ons tradi ng with 
Ghana. Dispar i ties in high prices for manufactured goods 
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an'd low prices for primary raw materials, were of great dis-
advantage to continued trade. 
In 1965, for example, 46.6 percent of all goods im-
uorte d from the bloc nations into Ghana consisted of manu-
~ 
factured goods classified chiefly by material. Machinery 
and ·equipment added up to 24.3 percent;::- Ghana on the other 
hand, exported 95.63 percent of food and live animals to 
the bloc nations. Despite the increased volume, the value of 
exports did not balance the value of imports, hence Ghana 
showed trade deficit. 
Economic pull of the bloc nations -- a boom or a bust? 
As i mporters from Ghana, the bloc nations made their 
impact on the Ghanaian market as buyers of raw materials and 
their impact as suppliers of finished goods was felt in var-
ious sectors of the Gha naian economy. Considering the fact 
that the bloc nations trade and aid commitments to Ghana were 
of recent development, and that trade with the bloc nations 
added up to a small portion of Ghana's total forei gn trade, 
the trade and aid with the Soviet-bloc nations exerted a con-
siderable pull on Ghanaian trade. The bloc nation's i mpact 
was significant because it was e~ercised at a time when the 
western nations were cutting back t heir trade and aid to 
Ghana . Th e bloc nations willingly supplied most of Ghana's 
industrial needs. Ghana t hen became the outlet of their fin-
ished products which were needed to start Ghana's mass i ve 
industrialization programme. 
~:-See Table V, p. 41. 
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Under trade and aid agreements there was an increase 
in trade, technical, scientific and cultural exchanges between 
Ghana and the Soviet-bloc nations. These exchanges were con-
ducted in the spirit of mutual advantage. We may ask, "did 
Ghana really benef'i t from these trade relations?" An answer 
to this question is given in the following paragraphs. 
Ghana did realize her objective of' diverting portions 
of her trade from the traditional tradeing partners to new 
partners. In doing so, Ghana expanded her market for raw 
materials. One of Ghana's objectives for extending trade 
with foreign nations, was to obtain more foreign exchange. 
In pursuing this objective, Ghana . increased her cocoa exports 
to the bloc nations. But, besides cocoa, Ghana's exports 
were limited hence ~he bloc nations were limited in their 
choice of import goods. Ghana continued to import more 
manufactured goods while her export earnings were unable to 
pay for the import bills. The result was unfavourable trade 
with the bloc nations. Until 196p, Ghana experienced serious 
unfavourable balance of payments and the prospect of salvag-
ing her foreign exchange through expanded foreign trade, was 
dissipated. The resale of cocoa by the bloc nations (espec-
ially by the Soviet Union) to Ghana's prospective customers 
undermined Ghana's chances of' earning extra f oreign exchange. 
The communist-bloc nations however, were successful in ex-
panding the markets for their manufactured items and in dem-
onstrating their willingness to assist Ghana in achieving 
her i ndustrial expansion -- the major pre-occupation of the 
government of Ghana. 
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Industrialization projects in Ghana proceeded at an 
unprecedented rate t hrough Soviet-bloc industrial supplies. 
This argument is supported by the fact that imports into 
Ghana were dominated mostly by manufactured goods from the 
bloc nations. 
The Ghanaian industrialization scheme had among its 
prominent objectives both the earning of more foreign ex-
change by increasing the value of exports of locally pro-
cessed products and the saving of foreign currency by sub-
stituting locally produced goods for imported manufactured 
items. The "ambitious" industrialization projects in Ghana 
with the help of bloc nations did not realize these goals. 
The failure of import-reducing industries in Ghana may be 
due to various reasons including lack of foresight, in-
eff icient management, under-utilization of expensive plants 
as well as the size of the market. The Economist remarked, 
· The haphazard . acquisition of new factories was 
accompanied by widespread incompetence in running 
them. This was partly because .the management 
of state industries was increasingly turned over 
to the party hacks while padded payrolls added 
their own deadweight (according to one spokesman 
of the present government, the 55 state corp-
orations could be run ~ith 60,000 men instead of 
the 100,000 employed.) 
Up to 1965, impo r t-substituting industries have not in 
any appreciable way shown promising signs of their capacity 
to change the time-long Ghanaian pattern of foreign trade by 
decreasing the importation of foreign manufactured goods. 
8 
The Economist, ibid., p. 555. 
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Ghanaian exports continued to be dominated by agricultural 
products and imports by manufactured goods despite rapid in-
dustrialization. The only change worthy of keen observation 
was the ratio·;.of consumer goods to manufactured capital goods 
in Ghana's imports. Though consumer items formed a small 
portion of the total import value, their significance may hot 
be underestimated. I n a sense, increased consumer goods would 
in the long run contribute towards the improvement of the 
quality and efficiency of the labour force and eventually 
increase industrial and agricultural productivity. 
Ghana's economic relations with the bloc nations intro-
duced new practices into the agricultural sector as it did 
in other sectors. Small scale farming which was very typical 
of the pre-independence years continued to be of little 
relevance to the economy. "Ghana's agricultural output de-
pends almost wholly on l~ million peasant farmers cultivating 
holdings that average less than 4 acres, even 20 percent of 
the population, therefore does not produce enough food for 
the nation. 119 To increase agricultural productivity and 
diversification of cash crops, the government of Ghana en-
gaged in large scale commercial farming. 
Until the post-independence years, the government of 
Ghana did not actively participate in farming of any kind. 
The government provided technical assistance to farmers. By 
1963, the government had added direct participation to its 
c . 
9Ibid., p. 564. 
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role. With the help of Soviet-bloc advisors, numerous ex-
perimental agricultural projects were started by the state 
owned and controlled corporation, the State Farms Cooperation. 
The idea of state owned farms demonstrates the influence of 
the Soviet-bloc nations in Ghana. 
In 1965, a total of 64,264 acres of land were cul-
tivated by the State Farms Corporation with the aid of 
Soviet-bloc specialists. Although there were considerable 
increases in acreage over the previous year10 and according to 
the Ghana Economic Survey, 
The output of t he organizat i ons , engaged in it 
have not made any noteworthy impact on total 
agricultural production. This situat i on is 
unsatisfactory when it is considered that 
enormous public investments have been sunk into 
these organizations.11 
In agriculture, both small farmers operat i ng on a 
small sca le and the state farms operating on a large scale 
suffered, according to the Economist of August 16, 1966, 
It was the agricultural prograQl itself that 
most damaged small farmers as the cooperatives 
were followed, in ·1962, by state farms. Seeds, 
fert i lizers, machinery a nd experts were lavished 
on the state f arms a nd cooperatives, while 
private farmers were largely deprive d of the help 
and advice they had forme r ly received, ••• party 
functionaries put in charge ••• became demoral-
ized . 
Less than 5 percent of the land acquired by 
cooperatives had been cle ar ed when the coop-
eratives wer e dissolved this year (1966), be-
cause farmers coerced into them went on cul-
tiva ting t heir own farms whenever they could. 
lOGhana Economic Survey , 1966, ibid., p. 53. 
11Loc. cit., p. 53. 
The 105 state farms, which remain in existence , 
have so far been produc i ngp million a year and 
costing.£? million a year.I 
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Despite the fact that the state farms were operating 
at a loss, emplpyment improved in the public sector of ag-
riculture. However, the private sector suffered because 
most of the labour on state farms was drawn from the pri-
vate sector. 13 The same is true of employment in industries. 
Ther e was a high level of employment in the state owned in-
dustries; as in agriculture , private industries lost their 
employees to state owned industries~4 because they could 
not op~rate at full capacity for lack of raw materials and 
spare parts. 
The direct intervention and participation in the ec-
onomic activities by the state was facilitated by extensive 
trade and aid from the Soviet bloc nations. As the only 
authority capable of negotiating with the bloc nations, the 
state acquired and owned most of the means of production. 
Foreign investments (mostly western) ·dried up and local 
business activities slowed down. These developments brought 
Ghana closer to her avowed goal· of establishing a "soci alist 
economy" which was approved by the other "socialist" coun-
tries. 
But the increased state ownership of the means of 
producti on was not an immediate panacea for Ghana's economic 
problems. The Soviet-bloc economic exchanges were just one 
12Economist, .!..lli•, p . 564 . 
13Economic Survey, 1966, ibid., p . 98 . 
14r..oc. cit., p. 98. 
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of the various measures taken to alleviate the economic 
problems which faced the nation. The economy showed declining 
growth rates. From the 7.5 percent indicated in that year, 
the rate dropped to 3.2 percent in 1961, followed by a rise 
to 5.3 percent in 1962, only to drop to 2.7 percent in 1963 
and then rise to 2.8 percent in 1964. By 1965, the economy's 
growth rate was a mere 0.2 percent. 15 The ~conomist asserted: 
Ghana's real national income had risen about 
25 percent a head since 1957, despite a 30 
percent increase in population over the past 
nine years and a 50 percent incr~~se in retail 
price over the past two (years). 
The nation was plagued by shortages of consumer and 
industrial goods as well as inflation. Food was in s hort 
supply but the agriculture programme was not adjusted well 
enough to meet the demand; food had to be imported under the 
import control measures already mentioned. Another factor 
which contriouted to the deterioration of the economy, was 
falling prices of cocoa in the commodity market. In the 
past years, Ghana had depended on about 65 percent of her 
total export earnings from cocoa, but revenue from the in-
dustry fell in response to falling world cocoa prices. 
Ghana's foreign reserves valued at $560 million in 1957 had 
dropped to $25 million. Rapid industrialization continued 
while deficits in the balance of pe:yments persisted. In 
short, the economic situation was "chaotic" in spite of 
15Ghana Today, Vol. 10, No. 21, December Jl~, 1966, p. 4. 
16The Economist, ibid., p. 552. 
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soviet-bloc economic aid. 
During this critical period, aid from the western 
world was reduced, hence the World Bank agreed to give fin-
ancial assistance to the stricken nation on condition that 
Ghana divest herself of communist-bloc affiliations (the 
soviet-bloc is not a member of the World Bank) and that Ghana 
would allow periodic examination of her economic progress. 
This was considered as undue interference in the nation's 
affairs, hence the proposal was rejected by the Ghana gov-
ernment. Private investors withheld their capital for fear 
of nationalization of their enterprises, although the Ghana 
government had given them assurance of adequate protection, 
repatriation of their profit and just compensation in case 
. t. 17 of appropria ions. 
The communist-bloc nations, which endorsed Ghana's 
economic and political goals provided most of the industrial 
and economic needs of Ghana. They increased the value and 
volume of their trade and aid. The assistance helped to ex-
pand the industrial base in Ghana but it was not sufficient 
to propel the economy into high gear for a "take-off"; it 
was devoid of a "big-push" element necessary in a pre-indus-
trial economy. Consequently, Ghanaian economy did not grow. 
In addition to causes which might have contributed to Ghana's 
economic failures , already mentioned, the most important 
single factor may be due to the manner in which the available 
l7Ibid., p. 555. 
76 
resources were allocated. It has been alleged that the gov-
ernment constructed "unproductive and grandiose projects", 
"incompetently pla nned, incompetently coordinated and in-
competently carried out. 1118 Inexperience, excessive cen-
tralization in the decision-making apparatus as well as 
attempts to solve economic problems with political slogans 
may have been the bane of Ghanaian economic growth. 
As a result of "mismanagement of the economy", the 
Nkrumah government which was disposed favourably toward the 
communist-bloc nations was overthrown by the joint forces of 
the army and the police. Domestic economic and political 
policies coupled with other external forces qi:lite beyond the 
least control of the Soviet-bloc nations, wrecked most of 
the trade and aid efforts for economic reconstruction in 
Ghana. The economic system was to:r·n between centrally 
planned economy (with greater emphasis on government owner-
ship of means of production) and "mixed economy" characterized 
by government ownership of public utilities, operating side 
by side with private ownership of the means of production. 
Goldman in his book, Soviet Foreign Aid brought the Soviet-
bloc economic performance into proper focus when he wrote, 
Communist efforts in other parts of Sub-Sahara 
have not been much more rewarding than in Guinea. 
The expulsion of Russian officials from the Congo 
is a well known story. Soviet foreign aid ex-
perience in Ghana, until February, 1966, while 
politically more effective was not very success-
ful in economic terms. After the ouster of 
18 
Ibi.d. , p. 17 3. 
President Kivame Nkrumah in February, 1966, 
there were major questions about the pol-
itical success.19 
The Ghanaian national economic policies belied all 
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efforts made by foreign governments both eastern and western. 
It would therefore be an oversimplification and arbitrary 
to describe the Soviet-bloc effort as a complete failure. 
By the same token, it would be wrong to overstress any 
amount of success the bloc nations might have achieved by 
February, 1966. 
Post-coup adjustment toward economic stabilization. 
The economic failur es and the general dissatisfaction 
with Nkrumah's political statements, culminated in his down-
fall. The ruins of government was taken over by the National 
Liberation Council which embarked on prompt restoration and 
serious reconstruction of the economy. Their short time 
objective was to bring the economy to normalcy and eventually 
restore a "mixed economy" and to disregard the "socialist 
economy" as propounded by the previous administration. 
To achieve these goals, the new administration renewed 
Ghana's trade and aid policies toward the western nations. 
The western nations responded promptly by increasing their 
trade and giving 'aia to meet the emergency. The State Cocoa 
Marketing Boru:'d reported that the United States was the lead-
ing purche.ser of Ghanaian cocoa during the 1964-1965 season. 
The United States purchased 124,050 tons of the 567,769 tons 
l9Goldman, ibid., p. 173. 
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of cocoa beans exported. Other major purchasers included 
West Germany with a total of' 73,169 tons and the Netherlands 
wi th 58,540 tons. The United Kingdom purchased 28,410 tons. 20 
The signif'icance of' the new trade policy was that Ghana 
r edirected her trade policy toward the west and earned more 
foreign currency to balance her trade deficits whi ch had 
accumulated during the past many years. Commodity exchanges 
with the bloc nations was discouraged. 
In addition to the expanded trade, other economic aid 
was given to Ghana. On March 30, four u.s. Air Force trans-
port p lanes flew 25 tons of powdered milk to Accra as the 
first installment of a 500 ton gift to help allevi ate mi lk 
shortage; and the Royal Canadian Air Force brought 6,ooo 
tons worth of spare parts for the Ghana Air Force. The u.s. 
and Ghana governments signed a loan agreement under which the 
U. S. government under PL. 480 will provide Ghana with 
$7,460,000 worth of food and other farm commodities. West 
Germany promised to lend about $3,600,000 toward Ghana's 
economic recovery, half 0£ the loan will be used to finance 
importation of essential commodities, e.g. (spare parts, raw 
mat erials and pharmaceutical products) fro m West Germany, and 
the other half will finance Ghana's hydroelectric distri bution 
system in Accra. Both loans will have a seven year grace 
perioa. 21 Ghana admitted specialists f'rom the World Bank to 
20Africa Report, March, 1966, p. 33. 
21Ib1° d., M 1966 41 ey, , p. • 
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study the Ghana economic situation and submit recommendations 
for reconstruction of the economy and rep ayments of debts to 
western governments were renegotia ted. 
To stabilize the economy, most of the state owned 
enterprises and unproductive projects were suspended. Gov-
ernment expenditures were drastically reduced. Russian and 
Chinese experts engaged in various projects, teachers as well 
d t 11 d f Ghana. 22 as oc ors were expe e rom 
The new administration renewed the economic and di~-
lomatic relations initiated by the previous government with 
the view to pursuing Ghana's policy of non-alignment and 
"positive neutrality." However, under the new regime, the 
bloc nations were relegated to an inferior role in trade and 
aid. The overthrow of the Nkrumah government and the en-
t husiastic welcome of the western nations thwarted the Soviet-
bloc objectives in Ghana. Soviet influence in Ghana was 
eclipsed. Izvestia, the Soviet government newspaper, comment-
ed that the military takeover was directed aga1inst the entire 
independent Africa. Vicktor Kudryavtsev remarked that the 
new economic reforms and the reintroduction of private own-
ership i nto industry had particularly dis turbed the Soviet 
government. 23 
I t is obvious that one of the Soviet objectives was 
the substitution of sta te owner ship and control through the 
adoption of "socialist economy" for private ownership in 
22Boston Globe, March 2, 1966, P • 6. 
23Ibid., March 6, 1966, p . 18. 
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Ghana. This ob jective impregnated with political ov ertures 
was short lived. 
However, their objective of expanding the market for 
t heir manufactured goods was partially succes sful because 
the bloc nations could not supp ly all the necessary goods 
"barter deals with the communi s t-bloc nations were struck in 
return for often useless equipment and unwanted consumer 
goods. 1124 Despite these disadvantages, there is evidence to 
s how that economic relations would be promoted probably under 
different trade and aid terms. 
This point may be illustrated by the fact that in 
1965 there was a trade diversion from the communist-bloc 
nations to the sterling area. Trade dropped fronn 23.8 percent 
of Ghana's total trade in 1965 to 18.1 percent in 1966. The 
fall in trade macille the bloc nations the t hird most important 
trade par tner followed in the second place by the dollar area. 
There was a small increase in the share of Ghana's trade with 
European Economic Community and the sterling area. 25 
The decrease was attributed to the new policy of can-
celling all trade and aid agreements which were of less use 
to national interest. 26 
Future prospects for Ghana-Soviet-bloc trade and aid relations. 
Despite the trade set-back, Ghana has signed protocol 
24New York Times, February 26, 1966, p. 8 . 
25Ghana Economic Survey, 1966, ibid., 1936. 
26 ' 
Ghana Today, Vol. II, No. 1~ , October 18 , 1967, p. 4. 
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agreements with the communist-bloc nations. Mr. Jan Poula, 
Czechoslova~ Deputy Minister of Trade, on behalf of his gov-
ernment, signed a long-term trade agreement with Ghana. 
Ghana agreed to exchange cocoa, cocoa products, timber, coffee, 
rubber, aluminum and industrial diamonds for machinery, trans-
27 . 
port equipment and other miscellaneous manufactured articles. 
In the face of uncertainties resulting from economic and 
political developments in Ghana, the question is, what are the 
f uture prospects f or Ghana-Soviet-bloc economic relations? 
As has been indicated, the uncertainties prevail in almost 
all areas of political and economic activities in planned 
economies and in an underdevelopedecono:ny as well, hence any 
future predictions should be made with caution. I na smuch as 
the "cold war" continues and human wants persist, economic 
exchanges between the two nations would continue. The terms 
of trade and aid may be ratified. 
Over the years, Ghana has enjoyed the advantages of 
increased -markets for its raw materials and although it de-
pends on the west for large portions of its products, Ghana 
cannot afford to lose the small but signi f icant trade and 
aid with the bloc nations. 28 
Communist-bloc nations have already invested in Ghana 
and despite changes in Ghanaian economic policies towards 
these nations, the lat ter is back on the economic scene. 
27 Ghana Today, Vol. 10, No. 25, February 8 , 1967, p. 5. 
28Berliner, ~· cit., p. 101. 
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This leads to the conclusion that chances are that in the 
near future there would be economic exchanges for mutual ben-
efit~ More probably, some form of economic programmes chann-
eled towards humanitarian reasons may be continued. Still, 
as tastes and economic needs change, trade and aid may be 
conducted on an ad hoc basis. Berliner confirmed this point 
when he pointed out that, 
As the economies of bloc countries become adapted 
to increased! trade with underdeveloped countries, 
it may well become more difficult to halt that 
trade if Moscow (and other c~~itals),~i- should 
wish to do so in tne future. 
On the other hand, continued trade and aid may be 
terminated when any trading partner reaches a "sa.turation 
point'' (the level where the demand for any particular comm-
d • t . . 1 t" ) JO Ch . . l t" . o 1 y is ine as ic • anges in economic re a ions in 
other parts of the world may indicate the urgency of the con-
tinued economic relationship. The growing need for economic-
cooperation between developed nations has set the stage for 
developing nations in the future economic affairs. 
Ghsna as a developing country would for many years to come 
depend upon i'oreign capital for investments, markets, and 
manpower developments. It is therefore reasonable to say 
that since Ghana is "not eager to accept communist tutelage,n 
or western imperialism, it would maintain economic relations 
~!-Italics my own. 
29Ibid., p. 87. 
30Frederick L. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade Systerg, 
'('Cambridge, ~Mass. : The Mi.:I.T. Press, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, 1963 ) , p. 185. 
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with all to ensure the availability of necessary commodities 
for economic growth and development and at the same time 
pursue its policy of non-alignment. This holds true for the 
entire Sub-Sahara region. 
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